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Introduction
In 1983, two years before Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, Joseph Berliner,
that doyen of Western research on Soviet industrial relations, wrote a remarkably
prescient article,1 which outlined the constrained options for reforming the Soviet
economy, and then evaluated the likelihood of political success for each strategy. Berliner
foresaw four realistic approaches to communist economic reform: the “conservative
model,” which tinkered ‘scientifically’ with new techniques of central planning; the
“reactionary model,” which restored the alleged discipline and top-down control of the
Stalinist period; the “radical model,” which decentralized central planning to allow for
Hungarian-style enterprise autonomy; and the “liberal model,” which authorized a
laissez-faire market for small private firms, surrounding an untouched central planned
core of state-owned enterprises. 2 He ranked the likelihood of political success for each
alternative in inverse proportion to their threat to entrenched ministerial power. Berliner’s
analysis was astute enough to predict the categories through which Gorbachev’s reform
program moved:3 from Andropov-style discipline in 1985-6, to the Hungarian-like Law
on State Enterprises in 1987, to the liberal Law on Cooperatives in 1988. He did not
omnisciently foresee Gorbachev’s final revolutionary choice of political democratization
in 1989. No one foresaw the wild whirligig of reforms through which Gorbachev rapidly
escalated, much less the fall of the Soviet Union. But at least Berliner understood the
structure of the economic-cum-political reform problem that Gorbachev faced.
In sharp contrast to Gorbachev’s radical reforms, which led to the cataclysmic
collapse of the Soviet Union, Deng Xiaoping famously introduced gradual economic
1

Joseph S. Berliner, “Planning and Management,” pp. 350-90 in Bergson and Levine (1983). Reprinted in
Berliner (1988).
2
This had been the NEP (New Economic Program) approach of Lenin and Bukharin in the mid 1920s,
before Stalin eliminated that in 1929 with his forced collectivization of agriculture and his wildly ambitious
first five year plan.
3
Brezhnev-style tinkering with central planning was the only one of Berliner’s reform options that
Gorbachev rejected out of hand, because of his commitment not to be Brezhnev.
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reforms with no political change. This led to the most vibrant capitalist economy on earth
today. Based on this sample of two and 20/20 hindsight, it is now conventional wisdom
that gradual economic reform is superior to radical political change for inducing efficient
economic markets. This lazy interpretation of communist-transition events in the 1980s is
superficial in part because it is based on a shallow and teleological historical vision.
Change one’s temporal focus to the 1950s and 1960s, and the Soviet Union becomes the
one with the incremental economic reform and no political reform, and China the one
with cataclysmic economic and political changes. Few would consider either of these
cases successful, economically or politically. Change one’s temporal focus again to the
1930s, and the Soviet Union regains its status of radical economic and political change
coupled together. No one can defend Stalin’s deliberate policy of murdering and
imprisoning untold millions of his own people. But measured either on Stalin’s personal
yardstick of his drive to power or on the institutional yardstick of regime stability,
Stalin’s “political reforms” have to be judged a success. And on the unforgiving yardstick
of ghastly world war with Hitler, Stalin’s “economic reforms” have to be judged an
astonishing success as well. 4 Expanding the sample and the historical vision makes the
“best” strategy for communist economic reform not a simple matter to decide.
In this chapter I lay out a framework for analyzing the co-evolution of economics
and politics in communist systems, consistent theoretically with other chapters in this
volume. Success for such an analysis is to be measured not by the vainglorious standard
of predicting the future, even in hindsight.5 It is to be measured instead, like the work of
Berliner, on the yardstick of whether it can identify finite trajectories of evolutionary
economic development, reachable through realistic politics of regimes of the time.
Whether the innumerable details of the complex cases to be analyzed below are all
predicted is less important on this standard than whether the structure of the theoretical
logic produces a tractable way of understanding the co-evolution of states and markets.
Just to be formulaic about my search strategy for such a co-evolutionary schema:

4

I return to this contestable statement below.
The experience of intelligent but foolish Western economic advisors to Gorbachev and Yeltsin should be
enough to cure us all of the disease of unbounded (and dangerous) self-confidence. Interestingly, the
impressive success of economic reform under Deng Xiaoping was achieved without any “helpful” advice
from western academics.
5
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1. First, array political and economic systems or networks on top of each other (or
side by side), something like figure 1 in the introductory chapter.
2. Second, pay careful attention to organizational linkages between systems, since
these are likely to be loci for dynamic evolutionary feedback and the emergence of new
actors. In the context of this chapter, this means looking for the politics induced by
economic reforms, and for the economics induced by political reforms.
3. Third, trace historically how intentional change in one system, either in
economics or in politics, spilled over (positively or negatively) into often unintentional
change in the coupled system. Multiple feedbacks induce multiple, possibly
contradictory, chain reactions.
4. Fourth, induce from these macro histories the micro autocatalytic networks that
caused politics or economics to take off (or not) into observed self-reinforcing feedback
loops of new political alliances and/or economic markets. At their base, these network
micro-foundations are reproducing flows of biographies and resources.
5. Fifth, find social-network data to verify or disconfirm the hypothesized
autocatalytic mechanism that induced the observed evolutionary transformation. In my
previous research on Renaissance Florence, I had such data (as does Powell for biotech),
but in this chapter on communist transitions I do not. This chapter, therefore, will proceed
only through the first four of these research stages – namely, learning and interpretation,
but not proof. 6
To put this theoretical search in didactic terms: to think about economic reform
without thinking about the politics that it provokes is not to think very deeply about
economic reform. To move from a vision to a reality, economic reform has to induce the
interests that can carry it through. Triggered politics in support of a reform or in
deflection of it, moreover, always emerges on a lattice of previously co-evolved
economic and political networks, which have been laid down in previous iterations. This
was the fatal flaw of western economic advice to Soviet leaders in the 1980s and 1990s:
to assume that communism could be transformed by decree. Organic network systems are
never designs; they are transformations, often turbulent and unintended, of older network

6

This is not to apologize. Without the first four research stages, one does not know what to count or where
to look for confirmatory data.
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systems that have tipped into the new. Whatever the fantasies of utopian reformers, blank
slates do not exist in real history. All understanding of innovation must begin with a deep
analysis of what was there before.

Dual Hierarchy
I will start with a simplification. The Soviet Union, China, and Eastern European
states differed in many important respects,7 but they all shared the dual-hierarchy
skeleton sketched in figure 1. All communist systems were dual hierarchies in this sense:
an economic pillar of centrally planned state-owned enterprises was paralleled by a
political pillar of communist party branches and cells, which interpenetrated, monitored,
and attempted to control the economic pillar. One pillar was economics, the other was
politics, but they both linked organizationally to each other at multiple levels, like a
ladder.
-- figure 1 about here --Communist economies, at least at their cores, were central-command economies.
The leader (party secretary in the Soviet Union, chairman in China), in consultation with
his politburo and council of ministries, 8 established priorities for economic development.
Under Stalin and most of his Soviet successors, the economic development of heavy
industry and defense was top priority, sometimes almost exclusively so. Central
economic ministries developed annual production targets for state-owned enterprises that
implemented the leader’s priorities, both within high-priority industries and between high
and lower-priority industries. Lower priority sectors fed into higher through supply flows.
“Central ministries” included both central planning departments (e.g., Gosplan), charged
with designing control figures for input-output material flows by industry, and industrylevel ministries charged with disaggregating the industry control figures into specific
production orders for state enterprises. The percentage of the overall economy covered by
the plan varied across time and across communist country – with the Soviet Union being
7

In particular, the secret police under Stalin, the people’s liberation army under Mao and Deng, and the
military under Gorbachev loom large as extra third pillars in the histories of those regimes. Schurmann
(1968) was the first western academic, to my knowledge, who analyzed communism explicitly in terms of
the concept of dual hierarchy.
8
In the Soviet Union, the politburo was sometimes called the presidium; the council of ministries before
World War II was called the council of commissars.
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almost completely planned, Hungary over half planned, and China fluctuating over time.
The detailed content of production orders also varied over time – sometimes with few,
sometimes with many aspects or indicators of production conveyed – but the core
command was usually a physical output (e.g., “make x tons of steel this year”). Positive
salary and promotion incentives and negative sanctions, sometimes extreme, were
attached to the fulfillment of an enterprise’s annual production orders.
The second hierarchy was the communist party apparatus that paralleled all levels
of the central-command economy, monitoring and enforcing fulfillment of the plan. At
the very top, the politburo and the council of ministers overlapped through shared
members. The Central Committee formally was the governing body of the communist
party, in charge of appointing the leader and politburo (albeit usually in a rubber-stamp
manner9). Meeting only occasionally, it was composed of high-level officials from both
of the pillars: provincial secretaries, economic ministers and the like. The secretariat or
bureaucracy of the Central Committee was structured into departments that monitored the
work of the Moscow-based economic ministries. Lower down at the provincial level, 10
provincial secretaries were held responsible for the overall economic performance of
enterprises in their region. They, jointly with the industrial ministers, appointed and fired
enterprise managers in their region through the nomenklatura system. At the bottom of
the dual hierarchy system, communist subsets of enterprise workers and managers formed
party cells within each plant, to report the plant’s performance to the party hierarchy as
well as to the factory hierarchy. Inspection and reporting, to check on laxity and
corruption, was called kontrol.
Needless to say, things rarely worked as smoothly as this organization chart
implies. In subsequent sections, I shall outline actual operations and compare those across
regimes. But the basic organizational ideas were not complicated. From the perspective
of the economic pillar, dual hierarchy operated to send commands down one hierarchy
9

Leadership control over the Central Committee was achieved through the “circular flow of power,”
discussed below: namely, leaders appointed provincial secretaries and ministers who joined the Central
Committee, which voted on the succession and renewal of the leaders. See Daniels (1971), Hough (1987,
1997).
10
In the Soviet Union, “provincial level” organizationally was a bit complicated: among the ethnic
republics of the Baltics, Caucuses and Central Asia, “provincial level” meant “republic.” Within the larger
and more populous republics of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, “provincial level” usually meant “oblast,” a
large subdivision of those republics.
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and to monitor performance through information feedback up the other hierarchy. The
two hierarchies were separated to inhibit lying. From the perspective of the political
pillar, dual hierarchy operated to instill communist values (e.g., “the Soviet man” or “the
thought of Mao”) into the productive personnel of the economy. Economics under
communism was not just economics; the ideological side was mass mobilization of the
nation for the future.11
No matter how simplified this sketch of dual hierarchy, it is still useful enough to
define constrained trajectories for the politics of communist economic reform, were such
a thing to become desired. First of all, it is obvious but worth saying that all reform must
come top-down from the leader. The basic dual-hierarchy organizational system had too
many cross-checking veto points for political initiative to have been possible from any
other quarter. In addition, the “circular flow of power” (footnote nine) gave to any
communist leader a secure base from which to launch initiatives. But leadership initiative
alone was never enough to accomplish reform. Leadership initiative had to be taken up
by others in the system, and then achieve self-sustaining autocatalysis among those
interests, for it to become anything more than a decree. The basic dual-hierarchy skeleton
defined the constrained alternative set of potential political allies that communist leaders
looked to in order to carry their initiative, whatever that might happen to be. The basic
options within the system were four: to reach down to provincial secretaries, to reach
down to local party cadres, to reach down to economic ministries, and to reach down to
state enterprises. A leadership initiative that appealed to none of these constituencies was
greeted only by silence, knowing nods and obstruction. But if it appealed to at least one,
then a sequence of conflictual events might ensue, tipping into reform or not.
As a first cut, the various reform drives observed in communist Soviet and
Chinese history can be classified according to the primary constituency the leader
reached out to. The most tumultuous of such reform drives – Mao’s Cultural Revolution
and Stalin’s Great Purges – involved the leader reaching around provincial party leaders
directly down to local party cadres. Such extraordinary mass-mobilization events were
not outside of ‘normal’ communist history; they were simply the most dramatic of the
inbuilt modalities of reform available to communist leaders. Indeed seen from the internal
11
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perspective of communist reform history, not from the perspective of the west,
Gorbachev’s revolutionary call for political democracy in 1989 was similar in strategic
style to the charismatic demagogues Stalin and Mao.12 Namely, Gorbachev like them
tried to mass mobilize political activists against his own communist party hierarchy.
A second, less threatening way to mobilize the political pillar for economic
reform was for the leader to work through the party hierarchy, not against it. Mao’s Great
Leap Forward and Stalin’s first Five-Year Plan were examples of this.13 Khruschev’s
regional economic councils and Deng Xiaoping’s fiscal decentralization were also
examples of mobilizing provincial first party secretaries for reform. These cases differed
in important details that were consequential for their subsequent evolution, but the point
here is simply that in their constituency politics they are members of a family.
The third political option that dual hierarchy presents to communist leaders
interested in reform is mobilization through economic ministries. This modality of reform
includes Berliner’s categories of Brezhnev-style “conservative” or Andropov-style
“reactionary”. Which is to say, incremental not radical reform. One should not forget,
however, that this was the modality that Stalin shifted into, after his Great Purge, in order
rapidly to build the economy for war against Hitler. World War II itself shifted Stalin’s
heavy-industry-defense approach into hyperdrive. Thus economic mobilization through
ministries should not be considered only an anti-reform approach.14
Finally there is the fourth “Hungarian style” of economic reform, which involves
leaders reaching around ministries directly down to state enterprises, by loosening
ministerial control and increasing enterprise autonomy. Typically this involved not
privatization but reorienting central planning away from material flows and toward
socially regulated prices and profits. Ministries essentially become state banks in such a
transformation. In addition to Hungary as a successful example of this approach to

12

People forget that an important part of Stalin’s Great Purge campaign of 1937-38, which murdered over
six hundred thousand party members, was his new constitution, which granted considerable electoral
freedom (including the secret ballot) to the lower echelons of the communist party. These elections
reinforced and fueled denunciations from below.
13
It is interesting that Mao’s Cultural Revolution followed soon after his Great Leap Forward, just as
Stalin’s Great Purge followed soon after his First Five Year Plan. The logic of this sequence will be
explored below.
14
The developmental states of Japan and South Korea, while not communist, are additional apt counterexamples.
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economic reform, the Kosygin reforms of 1965 and the Gorbachev reforms of 1987 stand
as unsuccessful examples of this approach.
I do not list western-style private property as politically viable route to reform
under communism, because a constituency for that did not exist under dual hierarchy.
There was non-communist constituency for such a reform. Around the consumer margins
of the economy – handicrafts, small consumer goods, small private plots in agriculture –
a private market might become tolerated.15 But this would always be marginalized,
because private property amounts to a dismantlement of dual hierarchy. Any communist
leader proposing this would be overthrown.
Deng Xiaoping superficially seems to be the miraculous exception to this political
constraint – a communist leader who successfully transformed his central-command
economy into a western-style market. But actually I show below that Deng employed
traditional political strategy number two: the mobilization of provincial and local
government cadres to lead his reform. 16 As I explain below, it was the peculiarly
decentralized structure of state ownership in China, bequeathed to Deng by Mao’s Great
Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, that induced Chinese party cadres to behave as
precocious entrepreneurs, without private ownership. While it is fair to hold Deng
responsible in the short run for successfully managing China’s economic
transformation, 17 it is less appreciated that Mao was responsible over the longer run for
rewiring the Soviet version of dual hierarchy into a party-dominated decentralized
version that was tippable into quasi-markets.
On the Soviet side, Gorbachev saw himself as an economic reformer of
communism, something like a Deng. But in dynamic reality the reform process turned
him into a political revolutionary, more like Mao. There are many sides to the dynamics
of communist economic reform. One is the politics of reform – how leaders’ proposals
self-organize alliances to support and oppose them. Another is economic feedback – how
alliances and policies spill over into the interaction of economic enterprises. Finally there
15

NEP in the 1920s under Lenin was an example, considered by Lenin however only as transitional.
Once the pillar of the PLA army is taken into consideration, a more complete description of Deng’s
strategy will become “robust action.” Cf. Padgett and Ansell (1993).
17
By this language I do not mean to imply that a great man “did it”. All any reform leader can do is to
perturb autocatalytic processes into self-reorganization. The complexity of changing a country is beyond
anyone’s intelligence and foresight.
16
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is biographical feedback – how reaction from dual hierarchy reconstructs the leader over
time. Below I highlight these three interlinked dynamics in the communist-reform cases
of Joseph Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev, Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Mikhail
Gorbachev. 18

Stalin
To gather data about the co-evolution of reform politics and economics under
communism, the empirical cases that I shall survey in the rest of this chapter are as
follows: (1) Stalin, meaning his first Five-Year Plan, his Great Purge, and his world war
defeat of Hitler. The invention of this remarkable sequence was massively centralized
dual hierarchy dominated by ministries. (2) A short interlude on Khrushchev’s failed
decentralization. (3) Mao, meaning his Great Leap Forward and his Cultural Revolution.
The outcome of this equally remarkable sequence was party dominance over a
decentralized planned economy. (4) Deng Xiaoping’s ‘incremental’ economic reforms.
And (5) Gorbachev’s escalation from economic to political reform. The historiography on
all of these events of course is vast. I can only hope to sketch what I see as the primary
causal feedback loops linking economy and politics during these episodes, and leave it to
others to extend, to modify or to disprove my observations, which are grounded only in
secondary sources. My main objective in this perhaps overly ambitious comparison is
more to get the co-evolutionary topic onto our collective research agenda than it is to
provide the impossible last word.
I begin with Stalin because he invented dual hierarchy. Lenin made the Bolshevik
Party, but Stalin added central command economy to the Party. All other communist
reformers, even Mao, worked in Stalin’s shadow, because they permuted and modified
the basic framework that he built.
As is well known, Stalin’s monomaniacal economic priority was heavy industry
and defense: to build gigantic modern steel factories like Magnitogorsk and all that

18

In the section on Gorbachev, the Hungarian case of János Kádár is also discussed en passant. It goes
without saying that I cannot possibly cover everything in the vast historiographies on these very well
documented leaders. (The historiography on Gorbachev, Khrushchev and Kádár, while adequate, is not as
high quality as it is for the others, I must say.)
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supported them.19 In Stalin’s opinion, “we are fifty or a hundred years behind the
advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it or we
shall go under.”20 There was nothing innovative technologically about this; Stalin
imported advanced factory designs from the west. What was innovative was the
economic organization into which this technology was inserted. In terms of our
mechanisms of organizational genesis, this was purge and mass mobilization. Stalin’s
economy was built on the model of the Bolshevik Party, but then he destroyed the party
that Lenin and Trotsky had built. What this meant was demagogic centralization
combined with mass mobilization. The driver behind everything was war. Under Lenin,
this had meant class war, World War I, and civil war. Under Stalin, this meant class war,
war against imagined “enemies of the people,” and World War II. Science and modernity
were important ideological addendums, but at its core the Soviet economy was built for
war.
The focus in this chapter is more on cross-network feedback between economics
and politics than it is on organizational genesis, but a short synopsis of the mechanics of
the origins of the central command system in Stalin’s first Five-Year Plan might be in
order as prelude. The central-command system had its precursor in the War Communism
of the civil war period, designed and managed by Trotsky. “Design” is a misnomer for
this improvisation of nationalization and brutal extraction by the Red Army. Stalin was
not part of this charismatic army system; during this period he was only a high-level
party secretary or ‘organization man’ tending to the assignment and transfer of party
personnel for Lenin. Through this unglamorous organization work in party headquarters,
however, Stalin built a political machine of loyal supporters, mostly fellow provincials
living outside of Moscow and St Petersburg, grateful to Stalin for their jobs.
The central-command system in the first Five-Year Plan of 1928 was a merger of
Trotsky’s civil war policies with Stalin’s organization and political machine. Since the
cosmopolitan and charismatic Trotsky was the primary competitor to Stalin to become
Lenin’s successor, pulling off this merger required some tricky elite politics after Lenin’s
protracted death in 1924. But Stalin successfully oscillated first to the economic right
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(i.e., NEP policies) to eliminate Trotsky and his supporters soon after Lenin’s death, and
then oscillated to the economic left (i.e., Trotsky’s policies) to eliminate Bukharin and
other advocates of the milder economic development that Lenin himself had supported.21
The result was a war-like mobilization of the economy, but built on the organizational
back not of the army sympathetic to Trotsky but of Stalin’s political machine. This
machine was composed first and foremost of provincial secretaries.
Hence the core political constituency of the first Five-Year Plan, eager to respond
to their leader’s initiative, at first was the provincial secretaries. Stalin’s massive
industrialization drive promised huge factories and economic development for their
regions. Project proposals flooded into Moscow, with optimistic even outlandish
promises, as provincial competition for central investment intensified. 22 To Stalin,
industrial giganticism was necessary to win the inevitable future war with enemy
unknown. To urban party cadres, this was modernity and the future. To Stalin’s loyal
provincial secretaries, this was also pork. With central money, jobs and investment like
this, they could become their own little Stalins.
Of course there was the slight detail of where all the money was going to come
from. The well known answer to this question was forced collectivization of the peasants.
In other words, brute extraction of grain – both literally as material taxes/tribute and
monetarily as administered prices extremely unfavorable to peasants. Some of that grain
was then sold overseas to generate foreign exchange, crucial for technology imports.
Elimination of private ownership of land and agricultural free markets through collectives
were essential for this extraction to work. Stalin achieved collectivization by declaring
class war on the kulaks – ‘rich peasants’, operationally defined as employing others or
owning livestock. Stalin promised the substitution of collective tractors for private
horses, thereby potentially making everyone better off. But peasants were not fooled.
Massive resistance to grain extraction and widespread slaughter of livestock led to famine
in 1931-32. Resistance was crushed by the Gulag. Kulaks who avoided the Gulag fled to
the cities, where they tried to blend in as immigrant and mostly illiterate labor, to work in
the new plants. Soviet collective farms grew to be very large in acreage.

21
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Daniels (1988).
Harris (1999).
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None of this happened just because of Stalin’s decree. Party cadres in his machine
were motivated to do the dirty work. The Bolshevik proletarian party self-consciously
recruited from the urban minority of the Russian population. Hence party cadres socially
were surrounded by a sea of ‘backward’ almost foreigners, perceived to be impeding
progress and modernity. Resistance from them threatened starvation for cities and the
army, and thus justified in cadres’ minds labeling them as class enemy. The consequence
was shipping them off to the Gulag. Indeed with the right perspective, collectivization of
peasants could be seen by urban cadres as good for them. 23 Enthusiastic fulfillment,
indeed overfulfillment, of Stalin’s commands implied rapid promotion within the party.
After centuries, Russian peasants were used to brutalization.
Tightly coupling politics to economics through dual hierarchy, therefore, created
political micro-motivations for cadres to mass mobilize economic production, both on the
favored side of industry and on the exploited side of agriculture. Judged only from the
developmental-state perspective of mobilizing investments for mass-production factories,
Stalin’s organizational strategy of coupling economic development to party development
must be viewed as a success, 24 notwithstanding the fact that absurdly inflated production
targets in the Plan were not literally achieved.
But positive feedback between politics and economics was only stage one in
Soviet pre-war development. Production is one thing, supply is another. Autocatalysis in
economic production requires material production to be reproduced by other productions
with which it is linked through inputs and outputs. In figure 2, I reproduce from Harrison
(1985) a nicely simplified diagram of industrial inputs and outputs for the Soviet heavy
industry sector, to give the basic idea and ideal. Without knitting together Stalin’s shining
new factories into even more detailed plant-specific, self-reinforcing supply cycles like
these, the entire heavy-industry investment plan threatened to, and often did, turn into a
production bubble, as supply bottlenecks choked off inputs and made factories idle.
Central planning was all about arranging material supply cycles like these.
– figure 2 about here –

23
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This is the way Gershenkron (1962) saw it. Zaleski (1980) provides specific numbers on Stalinist Plan
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24

13
Given imperfect planning, however, economic supply problems generated secondorder spillover into Stalinist politics. Cyclic retrenchments of overheated production, due
to bottlenecks, were experienced in 1931 and in 1937.25 To the driven Stalin, these sorts
of retreats in production were utterly unacceptable. To Stalin, moreover, economic
setbacks required a political explanation. If politics was the cause of the boom, then
politics must be the cause of the decline. “Economic balance” was the counter-argument
of NEP reactionary wimps like Bukharin. Hence was born the dangerous political
diagnosis of “wrecking.” Class enemies like capitalists and nobility, and then like NEP
tradesmen and kulaks, were already well established outside of the central command
system. But what if there were class enemies who had escaped extermination and who
were now hidden inside the system, looking to sabotage? Economic downturn thereby
became a matter of war.
This has struck many observers as paranoia, 26 but in fact unreliable liars, slackers
and troublemakers, working in industrial production, can easily be found if one is looking
for them. This may not be paranoia so much as a highly politicized perspective on
economics. The first of Stalin’s targets as wreckers were engineering experts left over
from the tsarist days. Industrial modernization needed these people desperately, so much
so that they often were the second highest administrators in Stalin’s factories. But they
were politically unreliable. Early on, just as the first Five-Year Plan was getting
underway, Stalin launched his first show trial, the so-called Stakhty trial, designed to
prove to the country that many of these tsarist engineers were traitorous characters. In
response to his worry about politically unreliability, Stalin launched a large engineering
education program for proletarian and party youngsters, to create new cadres who were
technically able. 27 Because of the political cloud over experts, purely technical objections
to the speed of Stalin’s industrialization drive were de-legitimated. The management
emphasis instead was on political mobilization, which essentially meant sheer effort and
force of will.
The more serious problem of economic ‘sabotage’, however, came from political
“family circles” developed by Stalin’s own provincial henchmen, in defensive response
25
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to the impossible production targets they received and volunteered.28 The inflated targets
were ridiculous to begin with, but once supply problems percolated around the heavyindustry core, factory directors and provincial secretaries were missing their difficult
targets not by a little but by a lot. When Stalin saw this, he saw wreckers, with purge and
Gulag not far behind. Family circles emerged to protect the underlings, as well as to
empower little Stalins. These emerged both at the provincial and at the factory levels.
At the factory level, dual hierarchy meant on the one hand “one-man
management,” namely almost dictatorial control over internal factory operations (but not
goals) by the director.29 And it meant on the other hand interpenetration of all level of the
factories by party cells, who legally spied on and reported factory behavior (so-called
kontrol) to party superiors. Factory directors were held responsible to ministries for
production performance, and party cells were held responsible to party superiors for
production performance. If factory directors and party cells were at loggerheads, this
official spy system might have worked. But when times were tough, both sides had an
incentive to collude, in order to present consistently rosy performance reports to their
respective superiors.30 The worse the trouble, the greater the need to collude. Once
informal family circles developed at the factory level, then implementation information
flowing back up to central planning headquarters became lies, thereby rendering central
planning for next year deeply flawed.
At the provincial level, provincial secretaries shared with the ministries the right
to appoint factory directors, and hence they should have fired them if they didn’t perform.
Provincial secretaries at least were closer to the scene, more capable of observing directly
than were the ministries in Moscow. But when an entire region’s production on average
was unsatisfactory, then provincial secretaries and their factory directors also needed to
stick together. ‘Stick together’ likewise meant to report overly rosy production up the
hierarchies, so that no one in the center knew the truth of what was going on.31 It also
28
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meant shifting to appointments that were deeply personalistic (patron-client) in order to
keep collusion safe from extreme penalties.
These structural problems of informal networks and collusion persisted, at both
the factory and the provincial levels, throughout the Soviet era. At just those junctures
that bridged the dual pillars, strong vertical chains of formal authority were undermined
by horizontal networks of informal collusion and protection. The stronger the top-down
pressure, the stronger the informal response. It was primarily in this sense that Stalin’s
concern about industrial sabotage was not delusional – even though ultimately of course
provoked by himself.
At this point (mid 1930s), Stalin switched leadership strategies, effectively
declaring war on family circles. Instead of continuing to work through the Bolshevik
party, inherited from Lenin, Stalin reached around both dual hierarchies directly down to
their economic and political mass bases. On the economic side, he unleashed the
Stakhanovite movement32 in 1935. Stakhanov was a rate-busting worker, who produced
far in excess of his peers. Naturally, this frenetic overachievement did not endear him to
his colleagues, but Stalin made an ideological spectacle of him, celebrating his
achievements and sponsoring Stakhanovite clubs of honored and privileged “Soviet men”
all over the country. A generational wedge was thereby driven between overachieving
and normal factory workers, the former being young, the latter often older. A
constituency of fanatics was cultivated with links directly to the leader, and collusion
among cadres was combated by conflict among workers.
Even more ominously, on the political side, Stalin developed his secret police: a
third pillar, outside of dual hierarchy, that gave to him a new set of eyes and of
punishment. Torture and fabricated show trials were the methods of choice to get the
accused to confess and to denounce their connections “for the good of the party.” The
literature on the Great Purges is contested, with much new evidence for the conventional
view of this being a top-down operation by Stalin, 33 and for the revisionist view which
emphasizes enthusiastic bottom-up support from those who did the original denouncing.34
I see no reason for why both views cannot be correct. As always in communist systems,
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leadership initiatives need to reverberate through constituencies to move from decree to
“reform.” In the case of the Great Purges of 1937-38, revisionists have documented the
passion with which oppressed folks at the bottom rose up to denounce their local “little
Stalins”, who had been subjecting them to so much pressure. This did not happen
automatically, out of fear of retaliation from family circles, but it did so once the secret
police arrived credibly to “clean house.” After the waves of initial denunciations hit the
police system, police methods were sufficient to unravel family circles, link by friendship
link, in part because ‘friends’ then competed to denounce each other first. The family
circles of all provincial secretaries were rolled up.35
In light of the Gorbachev sequel, it is worth adding that Stalin’s new electoral
constitution, offering free democratic elections with secret ballot, was offered at the
height of the Great Purge. Stalin thereby made bottom-up challenges easier, and he
positioned himself as the classic good king who cleans out local corruption and
oppression to help his people. Hidden “enemies of the people” turned out to be
everywhere, as they themselves corroborated publicly.
The literature and I have tried to make Stalinist Terror comprehensible, but one is
always brought up short by the figure of 681,692 people murdered by Stalin in 1937-38.36
This bacchanalia of blood reached to the very top of the system: 70% of Stalin’s own
Central Committee were murdered.37 71% of the surviving members of Lenin’s old
Central Committees were murdered.38 Of the twelve surviving members of Lenin’s first
council of ministers/commissars, only Stalin himself was not executed in 1937-40.39
These numbers seem excessive, to say the least, if the only purpose was to discipline the
system. Instead of disciplining his lying underlings, Stalin (with enthusiastic bottom-up
help) wiped them out. This only makes any sense at all if war, internal as well as external,
is seen as the heart of the system.
Because of course now there was the problem of who’s going to do the work? The
answer turned out to be “the generation of ’38.” All those youngsters who had been avid
35
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Stalinists – the engineering school trainees, the Stakhanovites, the Komsomol youth
groups – benefited from astronomical rates of upward mobility, as virtually all dualhierarchy jobs opened up at once. Inexperienced thirty-year-olds, straight out of technical
school, were promoted immediately to factory directors and central planners. By
witnessing the fates of their elders, far from losing the faith, these enthusiastic youngsters
were told to go out and make a brave new world. Which they did. 40 Discipline and
enthusiasm all were reported high in the years after the Great Purge.41 It was then that
Stalin’s cult of personality reached its peak. Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Kosygin and all of
the post-Stalin Soviet leaders up until Gorbachev were members of the generation of ’38:
youthful Stalinists with some technical training who had the scary world as their oyster.
Given the Great Purge and all these eager youngsters, Stalin did not redo dual
hierarchy from scratch, he just repopulated it with folks who mostly were both red and
expert simultaneously, regardless of which pillar they worked in.42 In 1938, Hitler, the
real enemy, loomed over the very near horizon. The Soviet economy had always been
mobilizing for war under Stalin. Now it redoubled its efforts, with less slacking. The
percentage of the Soviet GNP devoted directly to military expenditures rose from 7% in
1937 to 15% in 1940.43 That was still a far cry from the 55% it attained at the height of
the war in 1942, but it was a significant escalation in the direction that already had been
prepared.44
Organizationally, this economic mobilization was manifest in an explosion in the
number of central economic ministries, from nineteen in 1937 to forty-three in 1941.45
Heavy industry and defense were the main sectors subdivided and expanded. 46 Young
Stalinists poured in to replenish the party ranks, but they poured in even more to
replenish the ministerial and factory administration ranks. During the war, this similarity
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in biographical backgrounds facilitated cooperation and coordination between the dualhierarchy pillars. After the war, however, as the generation of ’38 aged, it could also
facilitate renewed collusion.
I need not review the incredible events of World War II, except to emphasize how
much that locked in the system of economic ministries. With Hitler’s blitzkrieg into
Ukraine, the Baltics and the Caucuses, about half of the Soviet industrial economy was
destroyed. 47 Some crucial machines, technology and skilled workers were rescued
through heroic evacuation from west to east just ahead of the tanks. To say that the
regime hung by a thread at Stalingrad, both militarily and economically, is no
exaggeration. Even the government was evacuated from Moscow. Thus eventual military
victory is an interesting puzzle.
In my reading, the English economist Mark Harrison has looked most deeply into
this issue of the surprisingly resilient nature of the Soviet military economy. Though
factories in the protected Urals always cranked out armaments, Harrison has shown that,
in 1941 and 1942, Soviet economic planning mostly collapsed. State officials of all types
instead scrambled through crisis management to extract every resource in the country and
send it to the front, to the point of starvation. From late 1942 onwards, however, the
augmented heavy-industry system in the east roared on line, producing planes, tanks and
other armaments at rates that exceeded the Germans.48 What accounts for this eventual
superiority in Soviet military production? Harrison’s answer is mass production. The
numbers of (gigantic) factories and of armament lines, and their quality, were all much
lower than the Germans.49 But the Soviets produced those homogeneous and lower
quality weapons at massive volumes, whereas the German’s more advanced engineering
culture emphasized quality and diversity over quantity. In the short run, quality
dominated, but in the end quantity won out.
Ever since Kornai, and even before, it has been fashionable to denigrate the
efficiency of the Soviet planned economy: supply bottlenecks, hoarding, and lack of
technical innovation were chronic. Without in any way denying that reality, it is too easy
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thereby to overlook the power and efficiency of the military-industrial complex at the
core of the Soviet economy. Part of the economic trouble in the Soviet Union was due to
informational problems and collusion, inherent in central planning. But part of the trouble
was due simply to the intentional diversion of so many resources to war. In a highly
concentrated domain like that, without too many factory nodes, central planning can work
quite well. 50 The autocatalytic production and supply feedbacks sketched in figure 2 are
matters of supply-chain topologies and of balanced input-output volumes, not matters of
capitalism. In principle they can be attained either by central command or by private
markets. In the Soviet Union, I claim, central command did indeed attain selfreproducing autocatalysis in the military-heavy-industrial core of its economy.
The political lock-ins for autocatalysis in heavy industry were the central
economic ministries. Heavy-industry economic autocatalysis reinforced the political
power of central ministries, and the political power of central ministries reinforced the
centrality of heavy industry in the Soviet economy. It is true that the rest of the economy
was exploited to serve that core, but agriculture had already laid the infrastructural
foundation for that infusion of energy. Whatever the Soviet citizen thought as a
consumer, as a patriotic soldier, he or she could be proud.
Hence the emergence of dual hierarchy under Stalin. Despite its Bolshevik roots,
the Soviet Union emerged from the second world war with the weight more on the
ministerial central-command pillar than on the party hierarchy. Fundamentally this
orientation was due to the Great Purge, although the war injected a powerful stimulus and
co-evolutionary lock-in to the political-cum-economic organizational structures that
emerged from that Terror.

Khrushchev
My treatment of the other communist cases will not be as extensive as that of
Stalin, because Stalin in my and others’ judgments remains the ‘genetic’ secret to
subsequent Soviet regimes, and even to Chinese communist regimes. Dual hierarchy was
pushed in many different directions by other leaders, with various results. But it was dual
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hierarchy to begin with because of Stalin. That founding template shaped and channeled
subsequent co-evolutionary trajectories.
After the second world war, the Soviet Union became an empire as Soviet rule
expanded to cover Eastern Europe and its influence to cover China. At home, Stalin ruled
as a personalistic dictator through ministries and ad hoc committees, with the Politburo
and the Central Committee effectively ceasing to meet. Upon his death in 1953, his elite
henchmen – Molotov, Malenkov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Mikoyan and others – united to
eliminate Beria, the head of the secret police. With that, the Gulag and the Terror ended,
and also the rapid social mobility that had produced them. Family circles started to
flourish again.
A succession struggle pitted the power of Malenkov and Molotov, rooted in the
ministries, with that of the earthy Khrushchev – former agricultural cadre and party boss
of the Ukraine and Moscow – rooted in the weakened party. Khrushchev imitated the
early Stalin by cultivating a party machine of provincial-secretary appointments. After
thus consolidating his base, in 1956 he launched his dramatic factional attack on his
colleagues by his secret speech to the revived Party Congress. This aggressive and
emotional four-hour speech at midnight documented Stain’s crimes and denounced him. 51
World-wide, it shook Hungary into revolt and deeply alienated Mao. Back home, it
pushed the deeply implicated Molotov and Malenkov into retreat, while eliding
Khrushchev’s own guilt.
The reason to classify this succession struggle as “the politics of economic
reform” is because of sovnarhkozy. This decentralizing economic reform by Khrushchev,
implemented a few months after his speech, abolished central ministries and transferred
their planning functions and personnel to newly formed regional economic councils,
under the authority of provincial party secretaries. The political purpose of this reform
presumably was transparent to all: namely, to dissolve the power base of his rivals and to
increase that of his supporters. His opponents responded in June 1957 with an attempted
putsch: the majority of members in the Presidium (Politburo’s name then) voted to
depose Khrushchev. He stood them down, however, by stalling and insisting on
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confirmation by the full Central Committee, whose provincial members his supporters
frantically flew in from all over the country. This hardly could have been a more dramatic
political victory, not only for Khrushchev but also for the party over the central
ministries. Malenkov et al were exiled (but not killed). The decentralizing economics of
sovnarhkozy was important to the politics of Khrushchev’s victory.
If co-evolution were as simple as politics-in-command, then that would have been
the end of the economic-structure story and Stalinism, more or less, could have been
forgotten. What is interesting from the perspective of multiple-network feedback,
however, is that soon after Khrushchev’s and his provincial secretaries’ rousing victory,
he began to backtrack incrementally toward economic centralization. With no more
central economic ministries, the economy went down, as factory supply problems
increased. The economic idea of the reform had been that regional economies could
develop, with local light industry developing to feed the factory behemoths and
provincial parties coordinating it all. Not markets exactly but regional autocatalysis could
ensue, and central planning could become more a matter of arranging inter-provincial
resource transfers.
The problem was not that provincial secretaries did not like this. They behaved
just as enthusiastically as did their predecessors under Stalin’s first Five-Year Plan, with
local economic wheeling and dealing coming to substitute for material negotiations with
Moscow.52 The problem was the tendency to ‘localism’ (mestnichestvo) or economic
regional autarchy. Provincial secretaries resisted giving prized resources to each other,
and perhaps even more importantly Stalinist factory behemoths were too large and
specialized to find requisite supplies from within their nearby regions. The other
behemoth plants to which they needed to link were in other geographical locations. 53 As a
result, supply bottlenecks were worse than ever, no matter how creative the wheeling and
dealing by local party officials. Stalin in his grave defeated the henchman who denounced
him through the vehicle of intense industrial concentration.
There is more to the Khrushchev story, as slow economic recentralization
eventually alienated the provincial secretaries who were the base of his political power.
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For this reason, Khrushchev was overthrown in 1964, and his successor Brezhnev
reassembled in Moscow the economic ministries that Khrushchev had dismantled and
sent to the countryside. But that is enough to demonstrate the resilience of the Stalinist
system, which could absorb an apparently huge reform perturbation with no long-term
effect. Stalinist politics and Stalinist economics reinforced one another, even with the
cessation of the Terror and the social mobility so crucial to their births. War of course
remained crucial to the heavy-industry equilibrium, but over time administrative
routinization gradually led to technocracy54 replacing ideological mass mobilization as
the management method of choice. I will come back to family circles and to Soviet
economics under Brezhnev when I discuss Gorbachev.

Mao
Mao, to say the least, was just as complicated a fellow as Stalin. I will tell only
the minimum of the Mao story necessary (a) to show how Mao’s choices were also
structured by dual hierarchy, and (b) to establish the Mao structural legacy that later
tipped into so-called ‘capitalism’, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. Maoist
economic decentralization similar to sovnarhkozy, I will argue, was a crucial prerequisite
to the political success of this later transition under Deng.
China’s industrial system was set up by Soviet advisors in the early 1950s, so the
central-command economy, an emphasis on heavy industry, and dual hierarchy came
with the package. Even though China inherited a heavy-industry base from the Japanese
in Manchuria, China in the 1950s was as overwhelmingly agrarian as Russia had been in
the 1920s. The Soviet economy, though a very high priority for Mao then, would take a
while to grow in Chinese soil. Following Soviet advice, existing Chinese capitalist
enterprises (without the deposed capitalists of course), mostly on the coast, were
agglomerated in a drive toward business concentration. The emphasis in the first Chinese
Five-Year Plan (1953-58) was overwhelmingly on heavy industry: 48% of the investment
budget was devoted to heavy industry, compared to the very high 42% in the analogous
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Soviet first Five-Year Plan. 55 Central-planning ministries in Beijing were established to
direct the construction of these large factories and to coordinate their supplies. Sovietstyle one-man management and statistical accounting, both rather foreign to Chinese
traditions (and literacy rates), were implemented to run these large factories internally.
Given this imported Soviet framework, it is not altogether surprising that political
and economic co-evolution in Chinese communism was roughly similar to that in the
Soviet Union, in spite of their obvious differences.56 The politics and economics of
Mao’s Great Leap Forward in 1958-60 bears resemblance to the politics and economics
of Stalin’s collectivization and first Five-Year Plan in 1928-32. And the politics57 of
Mao’s Cultural Revolution in 1966-69 bears resemblance to the politics of Stalin’s Great
Purge in 1937-38. Even the temporal gap between their two respective stages is similar.
The differences are obvious enough: the Chinese communist party was rooted in the
peasantry, whereas the Soviet communist party was rooted in the urban proletariat. And
Stalin murdered his opponents, whereas Mao merely “rectified” them. But in my search
for general principles, I will focus as much on the similarities as on the differences.
The budding planned Chinese industrial economy was subject to the same
macroeconomic cycles as the Soviet economy had been: namely, sharp bursts of
investment-driven growth, mostly in heavy industry, followed by retrenchments due to
subsequent supply imbalances. 1956 was the first year of such retrenchment and
economic confusion in China as new heavy-industry construction and socialist
transformation of previously capitalist enterprises ran considerably ahead of the ability of
primitive central planning to manage all of that. Plus 1956 and 1957 were bad harvest
years in China as the first round of collectivization had just recently been completed.
These economic events were ultimately the stimulus to the Great Leap Forward, launched
in 1958. But how the dual-hierarchy system linked that cause with that particular effect
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was through the medium of politics. While the Great Leap Forward represented a
rejection, or at least a substantial modification, of the mature post-WWII Soviet model, it
also represented a reprise of the politics of development that Stalin had pursued early in
his career in 1928-32.
On the side of agricultural collectivization, the experience of China was less
violent than that of the Soviet Union. Ultimately that has to do of course with the fact that
the Chinese communists were a peasant party, not a proletarian party like the Bolsheviks.
Most Chinese cadres were rural; they had been living with peasants and leading peasant
villages since land reform. Local Chinese cadres were extremely enthusiastic about the
collectivization of their neighbors, in part because it increased their local power. Class
war on kulaks was mild,58 nothing like the Gulag in the background. In spite all this,
agricultural production suffered with collectivization. Chinese peasants, no more than
Russian peasants, liked having their newly granted private plots taken away. Despite
economic hiccups, the political ease of collectivization up to that point encouraged
Chinese leaders to think about going further. Certainly they could expect an enthusiastic
response from local rural cadres were they to decide to do this.
On the side of industrialization, poor harvests represented a double whammy,
along with cyclic retrenchment, because extraction from agriculture in China, like in the
Soviet Union, represented the ultimate source of resources for investment. In response to
these ‘normal’ roadblocks to rapid economic development,59 Mao and the Chinese
leadership did the same as what Stalin had done in the late 1920s: they turned to the Party
to mass mobilize. Not only did this mean local cadres at the base, but this also meant
provincial secretaries anxious for investment, development and pork for their regions.
The Great Leap Forward escalated, I will argue, because of enthusiastic response
from this constituency, but the initial incremental steps in 1956 and 1957 toward
mobilizing the Party for economic reform were initiated by the leadership. These
empowered the party to engage more deeply in economic management. The first step in
August 1956 was reform at the factory level: a backing away from Soviet-style
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‘dictatorial’ management by factory directors toward leadership by factory party
committees.60 The international context of this was Khrushchev’s secret speech, which
denounced Stalin’s personality cult in favor of collective leadership. The second step in
November 1957 was reform at the ‘ownership’ level: factories other than large-scale
enterprises in heavy industry would henceforth be administered by governmental
planning authorities at the province level and below.61 The international context for this
was Khrushchev’s sovnarhkozy reforms, which dismantled central ministries and sent
their personnel to the provinces. Mao did not go so far as to abolish all central ministries
– he preserved them for large-scale factories in heavy industry – but he did move 80% of
the central governments’ enterprises down to lower governmental levels. 62 The third step
in September 1958 was at the level of central planning: an emphasis on local authorities
taking priority over central ministries in factories’ dual-hierarchy subordination.63 When
all was said and done, the communist state still legally owned every enterprise in China,
but ‘ownership’ was now stratified by territorial level, rather than overwhelmingly
concentrated in the center, as in the Soviet Union. Figure 3 provides a visualization of
Chinese communist state ‘ownership’ of enterprises.
– figure 3 about here –
All of these industrial reforms directly increased the power of provincial
secretaries and local Party cadres, at the expense of ministerial and professional
bureaucrats. Thus while the mature Soviet Union had dual hierarchy with the emphasis
on ministries, communist China had dual hierarchy with the emphasis on the party. These
reforms were as popular among the party constituencies in China as they had been in the
Soviet Union under early Stalin and Khrushchev.
It is worth a pause in the developmental story of the Great Leap Forward to
explain why territorial decentralization, so crucial to the future trajectory of the Chinese
economy, was embraced by China, whereas Khrushchev’s experimental sovnarhkozy was
quickly rejected. The answer has already been adumbrated above: by the time of
60

Andors (1977), p. 59. Connected with this, “hands off” functionally-based accounting was also
deemphasized, since face-to-face touring, local inspections, and direct consultations were emphasized
instead. The quality of statistics about enterprise performance reported back to the center thereby declined.
61
Andors (1977), p. 61.
62
MacFarquhar (1983), p. 59.
63
Donnithorne (1967), p. 461.

26
Khrushchev, the Soviet industrial economy was vastly more concentrated than the
Chinese economy. The Chinese economy was perhaps on the road to Soviet-style hyperconcentration, but that was still far into the future. The Chinese economy for centuries
had been regionally decentralized. 64 Administrative decentralization both fit with these
traditional ‘natural’ trading patterns in China, and pushed toward regional economic
autarky. Local planners gave priority to intra-regional supply networks and resisted interregional transfers. The Soviet economy by the 1950s was too specialized for that to work
any more. Conversely, Soviet centralized planning in a de-concentrated economy like
China was a nightmare, if not an impossibility. Central ministries in China protested at
the loss of their power, but not too vigorously.
I emphasize these organizational precursors, because they empowered the party in
the economy. But the real Great Leap Forward was launched in 1958 with the commune
movement. This Chinese communist innovation agglomerated village-sized collectives
into much larger production units of 10-30,000 people. Curiously enough, the innovative
idea of the commune did not emerge full blown from Mao’s brow. It percolated up from
provincial secretaries, 65 whom Mao met on his numerous tours of the country. His own
speeches at the time emphasized production speed-up, both in agriculture and in heavy
industry, not any particular means for doing so. But communes emerged as the magic
bullet in a series of three party mobilization meetings in the first half of 1958 that Mao
held outside of Moscow in the provinces, in Hangchow, in Nanning, and in Chengtu. By
the end of these almost revivalist meetings between Mao and “his people”, the official
decisions of the National Party Conference in May 1958 had been predetermined.
The purposes of the commune were multiple:
1. to break through the bottleneck in agriculture, through intensified manual labor
more than through mechanization;66
2. to mobilize millions of peasants in the winter for large-scale agricultural
infrastructure projects, like dams and irrigation;
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3. to mobilize peasants also for rural industrial work, both in light industry and in
small-scale versions of heavy industry, like ‘backyard steel smelting’ and local
electricity generation;
4. to communalize private life through common mess halls, day care, and
‘happiness homes’ for the elderly;
5. thereby to put females to work in traditionally male jobs outside of the home;
6. thereby to free up males to move to cities to work in large-scale heavy industry
(with occasional commuting privileges home).
7. And without saying it of course, to give party cadres more power, indeed
monopoly control, over peasants’ lives.
For believers, this was a passionate rural drive towards the future. For
nonbelievers, this was like a Gulag. On the ground, some worked too hard, some not
enough. Given the catastrophe in agriculture, it is often forgotten that the Great Leap
Forward was actually a success at industrialization. The numbers of workers in advanced
heavy-industry factories rose from 4.5 million in 1957 to 17.5 million in 1958. Including
small backyard furnaces, industrial workers rose from 5.57 million in 1957 to 35.5
million in 1958. This extra effort translated into an increase in steel production from 5.35
million tons in 1957 to 18 million tons at the end of the leap in 1960. Of course paying
for this was a drop in agricultural laborers from 192 million in 1957 to 151 million in
1958. Agricultural production held steady in 1958, but then plummeted from 200 million
tons in 1958 to 170 million tons in 1959 to 143.5 million tons in 1960. 67 An enormous
famine ensued. The “Great Leap Famine” claimed approximately 20 million lives.
In 1961, the Great Leap Forward/Famine was ended. Urban immigrant males
belatedly were ordered back to the farms, along with every available cadre, to try to fix
the catastrophe. Mao sulked and withdrew from active leadership to let others, like Liu
Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping (both of whom originally had supported the idea) and Chen
Yun (who had not), take charge of repairing the imbalanced economy. 68 The communes
were not abolished, but they were hollowed out: with common mess halls ended, with
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grain production targets decentralized to the smaller 10-20 household level of the
production team, and with 5% of land given over to private household plots. Controversy
ensued over whether or not to approve an even further decentralization that emerged
spontaneously in response to the famine in many provinces: namely, individual
households contracting with their teams for their share of the target, with excess
production beyond their contracts to be kept by them. 69 Later called the “household
responsibility system,” the Liu-Deng-Chen side of the leadership approved of this
spontaneous delegation of team targets down to households, because that increased
production. Mao at first equivocated because of the emergency, but then in 1962 attacked
this extension as right deviationism, capitalism in disguise.
On the industrial side, ownership decentralization of medium and small
enterprises to the provincial and lower levels was not undone, but administrative planning
at all levels and statistical infrastructures within enterprises were tightened up, with the
consummate bureaucrat Chen Yun in charge. Most importantly, excessive production
targets were eased. The economy slowly recovered through these ameliorative steps.
I spent more time on the Great Leap Forward than I will on the Cultural
Revolution both because economic issues were more centrally involved in the first event,
and because I believe that both the Cultural Revolution and Deng’s later transformation
into ‘capitalism’ were contained in the residues of that earlier event. Take the outcome of
the Great Leap Forward/Famine, in other words, polarize it, and you get both the Cultural
Revolution and its opposite, Chinese-style ‘capitalism’. Let me explain what I mean.
In the political domain, the main thing to focus on, from the network perspective,
is the growth of personal networks (quanxi) within communism. I start with the
comparative puzzle that (a) the literature on Soviet communism mostly emphasizes
horizontal “family circles,” which emerged to defend provinces and factories from
excessive pressure from the center,70 whereas (b) the literature on Chinese communism
mostly emphasizes vertical patron-client relations, which spread from the center
downward.71 Walder made the further interesting observation that Chinese communist
clientage was “principled particularism,” by which he meant that personal loyalties grew
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up vertically among those who exhibited communist zeal. 72 In other words, in China
ideology and personalism were not contradictory, unlike the case in the Soviet Union.
Assuming these impressions are correct,73 I do not think it is necessary to resort to
cultural essentialism to explain them. When vertical pressure coming down from central
ministries is stiff, as it was in the Soviet Union, then (dictatorial) factory directors need to
reach out laterally to provincial party cadres not only to collude to subvert those
pressures, but also to find supply help in achieving them. But when ministries were
decentralized, as they were in China, all the pressure is coming down the party pillar.
When that pressure is consistent with increasing the local power of local cadres, then it is
welcome. But even when it is not, effective defense, if there is any, is more to be found
through powerful patrons in the center than it is to be found with impotent factory
directors in the regional locale. Formal and informal networks cross-cut in both places,
but because the formal was different, so was the counterbalancing informal. Horizontal
informal networks of personal assistance cross-cut the vertical chains of economic
authority in the Soviet Union. Vertical informal networks of political sponsorship crosscut the decentralized layers of economic ownership in China.
Two other structural comments are also helpful to understand the Chinese and
Soviet co-evolutions. Degree of elite unity shapes how the respective informal networks
behave politically. A unified elite, like the Chinese before the Great Leap Forward, gives
tremendous mobilization potential to trees of vertical clientage ties. But a fragmented
elite, like the Chinese after the Great Leap Forward, induces vertical clientage trees to
break apart into factions. Conversely, a unified elite facing nested layers of family circles,
like the Soviet Union, has no vertical faction within the system for a central leader to use
to break through horizontal layers of passive informal resistance. The main reform option
the system offers to such a leader is the dramatic one of reaching outside the system, to
blast horizontal layers from below. Stalin did this through the secret police; Gorbachev
did this through democracy.
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And finally, in the economic domain, the regionally autarchic tendencies of the
Chinese economy, compared to the Soviet one, cannot be emphasized enough.74 Regional
specialization and enterprise hyper-concentration in the Soviet case meant that economic
autocatalysis could be generated (with enough energy throughput) at the national level of
gigantic plants in heavy industries. Relative regional autonomy and enterprise deconcentration in China meant that economic autocatalysis more likely could be found
region by region, by connecting the inputs and outputs of local light industries with those
of local heavy industries.
The fascinating and painful story of the Chinese Cultural Revolution I will tell
only schematically through the terms of this analysis. Instead of the usual “Mao did it,” I
emphasize that vertical informal ties in China after the Great Leap Forward fragmented
‘naturally’ into factions as the elite lost its unity. Mao’s personal charisma as founder of
the country survived, but his leftist economic policies were de-legitimated in the eyes of
many: in the eyes of planners and bureaucrats, in eyes of the mass peasantry, and most of
all in the eyes of his own provincial secretaries, who all saw their strenuous efforts blow
up in their faces. If Mao had been content just to let the country taxidermy him into big
smiling pictures on the walls, Liu, Deng and Chen could have carried on with the policies
and networks they already had in place, many of which Deng revived after Mao’s death.
But the Red Army, the PLA, outside of the dual hierarchy, gave to Mao the political
option of avoiding this fate and of continuing to fight for his utopian dreams.75 It is true
that the Red Guards were Mao’s shock troops, like the Stakhanovites under Stalin, but the
Red Army was Mao’s analogue to Stalin’s secret police – namely, a third pillar the leader
could use to bludgeon a dual hierarchy that had tried to walk away from him. The main
difference was that Stalin’s secret police articulated with and effectively controlled the
raging generation of ’38, whereas Mao’s Red Army did not effectively control his raging
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Red Guards.76 Like Stalin, Mao defeated his newly discovered enemies and destroyed his
own party, 77 but unlike Stalin, Mao did not control his new friends. Perhaps murder is
enough to account for this difference. 78 Eventually one of Mao’s friends, the Red Army,
had to be called in to crush the other of Mao’s friends, the Red Guards. The PLA also had
to run the economy at the end in the absence of the purged party. The Cultural
Revolution, therefore, started out as a cleansing of the spirit but ended up virtually as a
military state.
The Cultural Revolution was not primarily about the economy, but economic
consequences were serious nonetheless. Liu Shiaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun (and
of course thousands of others) were all removed from their posts. Economic ministries
and central planning collapsed, so even the modest economic recentralization of Chen
Yun was rolled back. The Chinese economy, however, did not collapse as badly as did
the polity. 79 Regional economic autocatalysis and modularity provided China a more
resilient buffer against political chaos than efficient regional specialization and interprovincial trade would have. Too much party governance under the Great Leap Forward
destroyed the Chinese economy, but too little party governance under the Cultural
Revolution did not. The main thing the Cultural Revolution destroyed was not the
economy but popular political support for further mass mobilizations, either by the party
or against it. Economic decentralization was reinforced, albeit this time not by design.

Deng Xiaoping
By Western standards, there can be no doubt that Deng Xiaoping was the most
successful communist economic reformer ever.80 Measured solely by economic criteria,
the transformation of China he pulled off was little less than miraculous. The attributional
tendency post hoc is to anoint him a genius. But unlike Mao, Deng had no utopian vision.
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His famous declaration of pragmatism was: “I don’t care whether the cat is back or white,
as long as it catches mice.” While there can be no doubt about Deng’s shrewdness, the
nature of that shrewdness was not a brilliant plan, skillfully implemented. Chinese
economists interviewed by Shirk seem to have captured his and his allies’ leadership
style best when they reported, “When they found loose stones, they pushed through;
when stones would not move, they did not waste energy pushing.”81 Deng, in other
words, adapted to what he encountered, and to what he inherited. He was a leader but an
autocatalytic leader, part of the dynamic system he inhabited.82
Figure 4 presents a simplified overview of the politics underlying Deng’s reforms.
The columns labeled “leftist faction” and “reform faction” map onto dual hierarchy, as
the latter was rooted in the provincial parties that Mao had destroyed, and the former’s
last redoubt was the central ministries after Mao and his Gang of Four had left the scene.
The column on the left is the third pillar of the army, which Mao had mobilized
politically for the Cultural Revolution against his dual hierarchy, and which then
effectively ran the country at the end. Most westerners saw and remember Deng the
economic reformer, who orchestrated the market, but the other face of Deng was the
army, as Tiananmen Square reminded us. Deng toggled between these two political legs
in his struggle against the leftists who previously had exiled him. Deng himself, after
Mao’s death and his own ascent to power, did not occupy any of the powerful official
positions in China – party secretary, economic premier, or Chairman – preferring to
operate informally behind the scenes through agents. This governing structure is similar
to the “robust action” of Cosimo de’ Medici in Renaissance Florence, analyzed by
Padgett and Ansell. 83
– figure 4 about here –
How did this politics emerge, and what were its economic consequences? Most
commentators stress the economic reform policies in the late 1970s and early 1980s of
the household responsibility system, fiscal decentralization, and special internationaltrading zones, giving to casual readers the superficial impression of intentional design.
These consequential economic reforms will emerge in my account as well. But these
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reforms need to be understood causally from the perspective of communism, not
teleologically from the perspective of post-communism. Even systems that are new are
rewirings of pieces that are old.
So let me begin my survey of co-evolutionary dynamics under Deng not with
economics but with the army, where Mao left off. Two years before he died in 1976, Mao
recalled Deng from exile because of the politics of the army. With the PLA both
administratively84 and politically85 as powerful as it was, and with disorder still rampant,
the potential for military coup was high. Indeed in 1971 Lin Biao – that PLA head,
fanatic ally and chosen successor to Mao – tried but failed to assassinate Mao and to pull
a military coup, before dying in a plane crash in flight from the country. All of Lin’s
leftist supporters in the military were immediately purged. This purge actually weakened
Mao’s control over the remaining more professional army, because that red faction had
been the instrument of Mao’s personal control. Instead of an overpowering leader capable
of mobilizing millions, Mao at the enfeebled end of his life was reduced to playing off
elite factions against each other, in a politics of courtly intrigue.
In October 1974, with Zhou Enlai suffering a terminal illness, Mao recalled Deng
from exile for two reasons: (a) to substitute for Zhou in running the economy, and (b) to
enable the simultaneous rotation of eight commanding officers of PLA military regions,
to weaken their power bases and their collective potential for a new coup. “The elements
of the bargain were clear. In return for giving up political power, the generals were
promised that it would be put into the responsible hands of a trusted old comrade.” 86
Deng only lasted a year before Mao fired him a second time, because of Mao’s distrust of
Deng and of his brusque, no-nonsense approach to his new job.87 But the incident
revealed the popularity of Deng in the purged army. Their deep sympathy for Deng (not
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necessarily anti-Maoist) dated back to the civil war and Long March days, when Deng
himself had been a young general. Struggle for the allegiance of the military was the
inflection-point politics in the interregnum period between the death of Mao in 1976 and
Deng’s return to power in 1978.
The most rabid Maoist faction, the Gang of Four, was arrested a mere month after
Mao’s death. No one, especially not the army, wanted them anymore. Deng Xiaoping
was recalled again in mid 1977, but not as leader, and many leftist provincial secretaries
were purged.88 But Deng Xiaoping and his old friends still had to contend with Mao’s
appointed successor, new Chairman Hua Guofeng and the remaining leftists at the center
who supported him. Susan Shirk, in her insightful 1993 study of “the political logic of
economic reform in China,” makes this succession struggle and the subsequent one into
the main political drivers behind Deng’s successful post-Mao economic reforms. I do not
disagree with her analysis, indeed I build on it, but a political contest between Deng and
Hua seems imbalanced from the start. Old Guard Deng had deep and wide informal
connections to all parts of the apparatus, whereas newcomer Hua had only the resources
of formal state office. Too exclusive a focus on post-Mao events risks missing the deeper
historical trajectories upon which those contemporary events sat.89
Hua Guofeng, Mao’s latest chosen successor, behaved as one would expect from
someone whose power base was the central ministries. He tried to revive Stalinist heavyindustry growth strategies, this time paid for not by grain extraction but by petroleum
exports. Unfortunately they did not find as much oil as they needed to find, so Hua’s
ambitious Five-Year central plan was a bust virtually from the start. The incident reveals,
however, that Stalinism was still alive and well in China, even at this late date.
The other, more visible half of Deng’s first challenging, then ruling coalition was
his famous sequence of marketization economic reforms. These emerged through very
standard communist leadership behavior – namely, to reach out and mobilize local and
provincial party cadres. The main reasons, besides lack of historical perspective, that
observers often do not recognize Deng’s reform strategy as standard communist behavior
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are two twists. The first tactical twist was that usually communist leaders initiated and
constituencies responded (or not), whereas with Deng first the constituency responded
and then the leader initiated. As a matter of leadership style, this tactical difference is
significant: Deng and his personal vision were more inscrutable this way. But as a matter
of structural feedback, the positive reinforcement that political leaders and party
constituencies gave to each other was the same, whoever initiated the feedback cycle.
The second, deeply consequential twist, of course, is that usually leaderprovincial-secretary feedback in communist dual hierarchies led to centralization (the socalled circular flow of power), both in the political and in the economic domains. In the
case of Deng, however, it led to centralization (or more accurately to re-centralization) in
the political domain, but to market-style decentralization in the economic domain.
Explaining this unexpected divergence in economic outcome from standard communist
dynamics is the heart of the Deng puzzle.
My fundamental longue durée solution to this puzzle will be that these political
dynamics played out in China, but not in the Soviet Union, on the administrative lattice
of figure 3. In the short run, moreover, the barriers between central planning at the top of
that tree and provincial planning lower down in that tree were strengthened by the
factional overlay of figure 4. Other than through taxes and financial subsidies, the top and
the bottoms of the territorial tree were thereby decoupled – the center to remain in central
planning, and the provinces to diverge into local-governments-as-entrepreneurs, 90 free to
transact in quasi-markets. The vertical informal ties that pervaded the Chinese communist
system carried through the decoupling to create multivocal91 enterprises, which were as
much clients of their local government sponsors as they were enterprises in markets
transacting with similar enterprises. 92
The first step in these political-cum-economic developments was the household
responsibility system in agriculture. This gave to individual peasant households the right
to contract with their production teams to deliver grain or produce targets to the state, but
then to sell any excess production above targets at revived agricultural private markets
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(i.e., village fairs).93 This was officially authorized in 1980, but in 1978 the Third Plenum
authorized a variety of agricultural experiments that were essentially half-way steps there.
These official legislative actions did not initiate peasant innovation but legitimated post
hoc rapidly diffusing peasant practices on the ground. These diverse privatizing practices
indeed were revivals of informal peasant institutions that first appeared sub rosa at the
end of the Great Leap Forward. Yang has documented that the household responsibility
system spread fastest and widest in those provinces – like Anhui and Deng’s home
province of Sichuan – which had experienced the worst devastation in the Great Leap,
and which were the most physically distant from Beijing.94 The elder Deng’s agricultural
“innovation” in 1980, therefore, was actually a revival of 1962, back in the days when the
middle-aged Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun were practically in charge.
What was the politics of this first reform? The popularity of the household
responsibility among peasants seems straightforward, because they got greater
productivity and personal profit out of it. But communist regimes are not known for
doing things just because peasants like it. Peasant diffusion after Mao’s death occurred at
precisely the same time as Deng’s succession maneuverings to overthrow Hua. As was
his wont, Deng did not come out with anything as blunt as “I want this.” Rather the
centerpiece of his interregnum politics was the epistemological slogan “Practice is the
sole criterion of truth.”95 This slogan opposed Hua’s “Whatever Mao said is right.”
Consistent with this slogan, in agricultural policy Hua argued strenuously for the revival
of the commune, specifically the Dazhai-style production brigade. Deng did not oppose
this with the household responsibility system; he merely argued for experimentation.
Despite (or because of) this vagueness, powerful political feedback loops within
the party kicked in. Local cadres who had suffered in the Great Leap and who worked far
from Beijing rallied to Deng, because his slogan gave them political cover and
encouragement to do what they wanted. Local cadres nearer to Beijing were not directly
threatened, because they could continue with communes if that worked for them.
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Provincial secretaries were more cagy, waiting to see how the political winds blew, but in
general their sympathies were correlated with those of their local cadres. While not as
hysterically engaged in mass mobilization as his communist predecessors, in fact with his
truth criterion Deng subtly was engaging in mass mobilization. It is unlikely that the
household responsibility system would have diffused as fast as it did without the political
cover provided by Deng.
The second and probably most consequential step in this sequence of post-Mao
reforms was fiscal decentralization. This was the policy reform most smoothly enabled
by the previous communist administrative decentralization of figure 3. And this is what
got most of the provincial secretaries fully behind Deng’s ruling coalition.
Fiscal decentralization was something like the household responsibility system
applied to national state finance.96 All provincial governments would negotiate fiscal
contracts with the central ministry of finance about what level of tax resources to remit to
the center, with provincial governments then free to keep any excess that they collected
for their own investment decisions. Before this reform, theoretically all provincial taxes
and enterprise profits would flow to the center, some of which was then reallocated back
down to the provinces through the central state budget. A growing loophole was that
provinces sometimes were authorized to keep “extra-budgetary funds,” in order to fund
territorially dispersed initiatives by Mao. A problem with this loophole, from the
perspective of the center, was that provinces often managed to squirrel away as much
local money as possible into this off-budget line item, thereby underpaying the center.97
The political story of how the reform of fiscal decentralization to the provinces
developed is similar to the story of household responsibility. In 1977 and 1978, Jiangsu
and Sichuan98 provinces petitioned and received approval from the ministry of finance to
try out a variety of new fiscal management and revenue-sharing proposals, on an
experimental basis. The ministry, which normally resisted decentralization, approved of
these fiscal experiments and others as a way to gain greater predictability and security on
its own central portion of the take. These revenue-sharing experiments were judged by
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both sides to be a success, and fiscal decentralization was officially approved for the
country as a whole in 1980. Shirk emphasizes that different provinces received different
treatment in the contractual details of these fiscal revenue-sharing arrangements –
territorial discrimination she calls “particularistic contracting.”99 The coastal provinces of
Guangdong and Fujian and the original provincial innovators of Jiangsu and Sichuan
received the best deals, while the metropolises of Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai, which
provided the lion’s share of central revenues, received the most restrictive plans. Not
surprisingly provincial secretaries were enthusiastic about Deng in proportion to the
generosity of their deals, but on average provincial secretaries were ecstatic.
Walder on the urban side and Oi on the rural side have documented the profusion
of entrepreneurial businesses that exploded from fiscal decentralization. 100 Just like
peasants rushed to plant more crops and to work their fields harder when they were
allowed to reap the gains (even without private ownership of the means of production), so
provincial and local governments invested their discretionary revenues in their ‘own’
local enterprises and managed them better when they were allowed to reap the gains for
their governments. Purely private profit, called corruption, no doubt existed. But field
reports show that group profit was enough to turn local-governments-as-extractors into
local-governments-as-entrepreneurs. Local and provincial governments even developed
competition among themselves, Tiebout or local-boosterism style, about who could
develop their clientage enterprises faster.
Given the abject failure of Gorbachev to achieve anything like this in the Soviet
Union, it is worth re-emphasizing the structural precondition for this economic takeoff in
China. Administrative decentralization under Mao made the politics of fiscal
decentralization smooth under Deng. It also reinforced regional autocatalysis and even
autarky in the various territorial economies of China. Given this setup, local governments
could stimulate and guide their enterprises to work harder, and provincial governments
could arrange input-output synergies within these regional clusters,101 without much
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confounding interference from central ministries. In contrast, administrative and fiscal
decentralization in the Soviet Union would only turn matters over to family circles of
defensive collusion, who could find not enough supplies for their hyper-specialized plants
in their local neighborhood. Because of this different governmental structure, Chinese
economic takeoff was led by light industry not by heavy industry. Heavy industry in
China remained mired in the central plan, just like it did in the Soviet Union.
Over the period from 1979 to 1985, a third liberalization reform was also
implemented: Special Economic Zones in coastal ports to develop international trade
connections, in a geographically buffered way. 102 The importance of this for the
economic modernization and development of China hardly needs mention. But the
politics of coastal provincial support for this reform, and therefore for its sponsor Deng,
was identical to that for fiscal decentralization, so I won’t repeat that story here. In the
cases of all three reforms, what from the perspective of economics looks like markets,
from the perspective of politics looks like clientage.
Let me close my analysis of China by returning to the political coalition of Deng
Xiaoping, which anchored all of this economics. Narrating economic reforms, as I have
just done, makes Deng appear to be a reformer, which he was even though through all of
this he was building a political faction for himself. Appealing to local and provincial
cadres was something that Stalin, Khrushchev and Mao also had done before him, in
different circumstances. Deng’s particular circumstances were the decentralization
(“politics in command”) administrative modifications of the Soviet system, implemented
by Mao intentionally during the Great Leap Forward and unintentionally during the
Cultural Revolution. Deng’s provincial cadres were in substantial part those who had
been persecuted during the Cultural Revolution.
But Deng’s reform faction was only half of his political coalition, as I tried to
make clear in figure 4. His original political base actually was the army, so who one
interprets as “the real Deng” depends upon which allies one sees him in the context of.
Oddly enough, one can even occasionally see him as representing the central ministries,
after his rival Hua Guofeng was deposed from that power base in 1980, and his good and
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old friend Chen Yun installed in his stead. Like Cosimo de’ Medici in Florence, Deng
Xiaoping could plausibly be seen as having multiple identities and interests, because of
the heterogeneous support structure that he supervised. Because of this structurally
induced multivocality, which Deng did not puncture by uttering words or policies too
clearly, he could be seen as “a friend to all” (except the Maoists), and hence he floated
above the political system, not beholden to any part, as I tried to diagram in figure 3.
Administratively, Deng’s robust action was implemented, like Cosimo’s robust
action before him, through not holding public office himself but by operating instead
through agents. Deng abolished the title of Chairman, which Mao had held. He installed
his lieutenant Hu Yaobang as general secretary of the party (the supreme position in the
Soviet Union), in charge of the political half of the dual hierarchy, and he installed
another lieutenant Zhao Ziyang as premier, in charge of the other economic half. 103 These
lieutenants were hardly lackeys; they along with old pal Chen Yun were the sources, or
the messengers, of many of Deng’s reform ideas. Indeed Deng’s withdrawal to “the
second line” behind the scenes, away from day-to-day battles, followed in the footsteps
of Mao Zedong, who did the same thing in 1958 without giving up his title as Chairman.
Policies, vision and personality aside, the structure of Deng’s political control at its peak
reproduced that of Mao at his peak.
Informally Deng’s position was cemented by the Long March elders, survivors
from the founding generation of the communist revolution. Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, Ye
Jianying, Peng Zhen, Bo Yibo and other octogenarians had cycled through numerous
positions over their long and tumultuous careers. In 1982, Deng assembled them into an
ad hoc Central Advisory Commission, which technically was off-line and only advisory,
but actually was considered to be “the power behind the throne” in the 1980s. 104 The
second line, in other words, was not only Deng himself but also included his old friends
and battle-tested allies. This was an informal glue that knitted together the peaks of all
three pillars after the Maoists had been purged in three successive waves.105
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Robust action and its structural foundations had dynamic consequences for the
management of the developing Chinese economy during the 1980s. Without going into
the details, 106 rapid economic growth produced by the reforms and by political stability
also created problems of inflation and corruption. Robust action by Deng and his old
friends politically allowed them to oscillate in their 1980s economic policies, to
accelerate or to dampen depending upon the current mix of transitional problems. I think
of this oscillatory style of organizational management as like annealing in chemistry:
namely, letting explosive components find their own hybrid alloy through raising and
lowering the mixing temperature.
I give only a list of examples:
1. Large inefficient central plants, which normally would have been the institutional
foundation for resistance, were not themselves reformed, but rather were bailed out by
budgetary subsidies coming from provincial profits. These central-planning plants were
never shut down; just gradually employees drifted into more lucrative alternatives.
2. Local communist cadres, who normally might become jealous of the economic success
of their enterprise underlings, were bought off by becoming entrepreneurs themselves and
by kickbacks. 107
3. Restive provincial secretaries who got worse revenue-sharing and export-zone deals
than did the Deng clients cooled off as these deals slowly were extended nation-wide.
4. Taxes on state enterprises flip-flopped in form from particularistic negotiation of profit
sharing in 1982-83 to uniform tax rates in 1983-84 back to particularistic profit sharing in
1985-88.
5. Austerity measures to combat inflation, built around the recommendations of ministry
fiscal conservatives like Chen Yun and Li Peng, were imposed in 1988.
6. Most poignantly of all, in reaction to political demands for democracy by students in
Tiananmen Square, Deng called in the army in 1989.
7. Anti-corruption drives were launched after Tiananmen, as central-planning
conservatives launched a comeback.
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8. But then finally Deng reversed the drift of his elderly colleagues toward economic and
political retrenchment in his end-of-life southern tour in 1992.
Obviously more could be said about economic and political development in China
during the 1980s and 1990s. But the late 1970s and early 1980s was the inflection point,
which established the oscillating Chinese communist trajectory after Mao. Despite his
shrewd maneuvering among Maoist residues, Deng Xiaoping was not the only or the
inevitable trajectory of co-evolution out of what Mao had built. If the People’s Liberation
Army and the faction of the Gang of Four had been able to coordinate better – as had
Stalin’s secret police and the generation of ’38 – we would have seen a different Chinese
history.

Gorbachev
Finally, to complete this comparative survey of reform dynamics within
communism, there is Gorbachev and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The original
motivation for this chapter was a desire to understand that.
To situate Gorbachev among other communist reformers, not in outcome but in
strategic style, it is helpful to return to the simple representation of dual hierarchy in
figure 1. Dual hierarchy offered four possible constituencies to any communist leader
interested in reform. Within the economic pillar of the central-command economy, he
could try to appeal to central ministries at the top or to state enterprises at the bottom.
Within the political pillar of the communist party, he could try to appeal to upper cadres
at the regional and provincial levels or to lower cadres in local governments and
enterprises. Combinations were possible, but those were the four basic channels for
reform within the system. Given the virtual invulnerability of the communist leader, there
was always also the null alternative of appealing to no constituency and ruling only by
decree. But that was like talking to oneself in a vacuum: much gesticulation and
meaningless nods of assent, but no action. At the end, after alienating everyone,
Gorbachev wound up like that, but he had struggled strenuously to avoid his fate.
Examples of the first reform strategy of mobilizing central ministries include the
technocratic fiddling of Brezhnev and the stern discipline of Andropov. 108 Examples of
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the second reform strategy of direct mobilization of state enterprises, which end ran the
ministries, are Kosygin under early Brezhnev and Kádár in Hungary. Both of those
administrative reforms tried to loosen the stranglehold of ministries over enterprises to
create enterprise autonomy – in the first case unsuccessfully, in the second case
successfully. Examples of the third strategy of mobilizing upper party cadres include
Deng Xiaoping, Khrushchev, and Stalin early in his career. The radical fourth strategy of
mobilizing lower party cadres against upper party cadres is epitomized by Mao, although
the first Five-Year plan and the brutal collectivization drive of mid-career Stalin were
also like this. Most radically of all, Stalin after his great purges mass mobilized the
bottoms of both the economic and the political pillars against their upper echelons, to
repopulate both ministries and the party through the massive social mobility and the
cooptation of an entire generation of the country. All of these leaders were intelligent
actors, but they operated within the skein of reform strategies offered to them by dual
hierarchy.
In the first year of his term, Gorbachev was not only like Andropov, he was the
continuation of Andropov, both in economic reform policies and in top-down strategic
style. I shall argue in this section, however, that his Andropov-motivated struggles with
the Brezhnev system progressively turned him into a Stalin, not in policy objectives but
in strategic style. That is, Gorbachev came to rely heavily on purges and on mass
mobilization of both bottoms in order to try to create a demagogic alliance of himself
with the very bottom, against his own apparatus. Failing to achieve this within the
communist system, he turned in desperation to plebiscitary democracy outside the
system, only to destroy the Soviet Union and to pave the way for his rival Yeltsin.
Throughout the analysis, I refuse to explain the regime transition in the Soviet Union
through “reading history backwards” teleology. His own retrospective myth making
notwithstanding, Gorbachev was not a westerner like us, he was a Communist.
More programmatically, the two linguistically ambiguous words perestroika on
the economic side, and glasnost on the political side, expanded dramatically in their
application under Gorbachev. In just five years, perestroika (‘restructuring’) changed its
practical economic meaning from Andropov-style worker discipline to Kosygin-style
administrative reforms to Hungarian-style market socialism to market liberalization.
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Glasnost (‘transparency’, ‘publicity’, ‘openness’) similarly migrated in its practical
meaning from inspections, to freedom of the press and artistic expression, to communist
elections, to public elections. Gorbachev always claimed that the reform tracks of
perestroika and glasnost were complementary; indeed that glasnost was the prerequisite
for perestroika. I show below, however, that failure in one track always led to escalation
in the other track, back and forth in zig-zag dynamics. Feedback was contradictory, not
symbiotic as Gorbachev and western self-conception would claim, leading to ever
increasing conflict. The common driver behind both policy escalations was Gorbachev’s
vain and futile search for new constituencies, as old ones disappeared. Because of this
danse macabre with dual hierarchy, Gorbachev became just what he did not want to be –
not only a Stalin, but a failed Stalin.
Gorbachev emerged out of the Andropov faction. This is crucial to understand
from the outset, in order to disabuse us of the myth, fostered by Gorbachev himself, that
he was a westerner in disguise. Andropov – the first elderly successor to Brezhnev, 109
who lasted only a couple of years (1982-84) before he died – spent most of his career in
the KGB. His main claims to fame had been on-the-scene suppression of the Hungarian
revolution in 1956, and campaigner for repression of Prague spring in 1968. Together
with Marshall Ustinov, head of the Soviet military, upon succession Andropov
spearheaded a modernization drive to try to reverse the slow and inexorable decline of the
Soviet economy, especially in technologically advanced sectors of interest to the military,
which had occurred under Brezhnev. Gorbachev was a dynamic young man who had
risen through party ranks from an agricultural and resort district,110 with no direct
experience in industry or the military. Gorbachev became the protégé, even the golden
boy, of Andropov and Ustinov. Although he was only Politburo secretary for agriculture,
Andropov treated Gorbachev as his trusted number-two man, in charge of centralized
policy teams to develop proposals for economic reform. Kosygin’s earlier (1965) failed
reforms were revisited and mulled over in this venue. Even more consequentially,
Andropov placed Gorbachev in charge of appointments of upper-level cadres, as Lenin
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had done Stalin. In this powerful infrastructural role, assisted by Ligachev, his later rival,
Gorbachev began the extended process, initiated by Andropov and continued in his own
regime, of replacing provincial first secretaries and others.111
Andropov himself died before accomplishing anything. But he ‘made’
Gorbachev, both in the sense of giving to him his original political base and in the sense
of giving to him his original economic ideas. Gorbachev was a more youthful temporal
extension of Andropov, and at the beginning of his term behaved accordingly.
On the political front, new and younger provincial secretaries (like Boris Yeltsin)
appointed by Andropov/Gorbachev turned out to be critical for Gorbachev’s own
succession,112 as was the blessing of the foreign-policy-oriented segment of the old guard
(like Andrei Gromyko), who saw Gorbachev as committed to strengthening their legacy
of Soviet military domination. This alliance combination of provincial secretaries and
KGB-military reminds one of the provinces-plus-PLA alliance structure of Deng.113 Once
in power, Gorbachev revealed himself to be a master of the “circular flow of power,”
invented by Stalin and routinized by Brezhnev. While this did not happen all at once, by
August 1987 Gorbachev had replaced 70% of the Politburo (14 out of 20), 72% of the
provincial first secretaries (108 out of 150), 95% of commanders of military groups (19
out of 20), 45% of the Central Committee (138 out of 307), and 54% of republican
central committees (1134 out of 2089).114 Part of this was accelerated generational
turnover, long deferred under Brezhnev.115 But no general secretary since Stalin had
operated with such ferocious velocity in forcing cadre turnover. Purge was a Stalinist tool
that Gorbachev knew well how to use. In the upper ranks of the party, Brezhnev’s old
men were decimated. The continued voting support that the communist apparatus gave to
Gorbachev’s proposals, even the later suicidal ones, is incomprehensible without
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understanding this lock that he had over appointing the upper echelons of the party.
When the party hierarchy belatedly swung against Gorbachev, those for the most part
were his own people.
Glasnost at this beginning was an Andropov-style anti-corruption campaign.116 As
such, it was intimately linked to Gorbachev’s anti-Brezhnev purges. At the upper
echelons of the party, general secretaries pretty much could just fire people as they
pleased, as long as they proceeded tactfully. The lower down one went in the party,
however, the informational problem became knowing whom to fire, since everyone
mouthed the right words, and superiors of derelict clients usually vouched for their own
appointees. The issue was family circles, which as everything goes back to Stalin. 117
People theoretically were supposed to check on each other and report to the center, but to
defend themselves against unbearable top-down heat, they often formed collusive
cocoons of silences and lies. Central leaders required extra-party informational channels
to combat this. For Stalin, this was his secret police. For Andropov, this was the KGB.
For Gorbachev, this was investigative reporting by newspapers.118 Gorbachev early in
1986 instituted freedom of the press, not because of the American bill of rights, but
because of his need for exposés, to intensify and justify his purges. 119
On the economic policy front as well, Gorbachev at first just continued Andropov.
In 1985 and early 1986, Gorbachev was more involved in consolidating his power than
anything else, but nonetheless he did launch a number of economic initiatives: extension
of Andropov’s large-scale experiments on enterprise autonomy; acceleration in
production in a new Five-Year plan; increased investments in high technology;
prohibition of alcohol to combat laxity at work; a centralized quality-inspection program,
modeled on military production; and finally a crackdown on ‘unearned incomes’ (like
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corruption, embezzlement, and private enterprise).120 These measures were ad hoc, but
they reflected the stern-discipline vision of Gorbachev’s mentor from the KGB. Even
central ministries could approve of old-school disciplinary ideas like these. Russian
workers, however, seethed at having their bonuses and their booze cut.121
In the background, however, policy reform teams of Soviet academics – first
established by Andropov (and chaired by Gorbachev) and then continued by Gorbachev
(and chaired by Ryzkhov, another Andropov protégé) – laid the seeds for a more
comprehensive next step in peristroika: namely, revisiting and updating the Kosygin
reforms, which had sought greater autonomy and initiative for enterprise directors outside
the ‘petty tutelage’ of ministries. 122 Mostly these administrative reforms involved
changing economic performance indicators of firms: away from physical production
targets, mandated by ministries, and toward financial indicators like profits, calculated on
the basis of administered prices. Hungary under Kádár had successfully made this
transition in 1968 with his New Economic Mechanism (NEM), whereas Kosygin’s own
Soviet attempt in 1965 had been foiled by the ministries, whose decision-making
monopoly this attacked.123 These enterprise-autonomy ideas were more threatening to
central ministries than the first round of disciplinary policies had been. Kosygin had lost
because Brezhnev and the party hierarchy ultimately backed the ministries over him. But
now times were propitious for revisiting this Hungarian-style reform: the party was
controlled by someone who wanted it. And indeed this reformist track after much internal
politicking eventually led to the perestroika flagship Law on State Enterprises in 1987,
which destroyed the Soviet economy in 1989.
Starting in earnest in 1986 and carrying through 1987, purges, glasnost, and the
second round of perestroika were serious body blows to the core of the Soviet apparatus.
Purges and glasnost attacked the declining Brezhnev guts of the party; the second round
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of perestroika attacked central ministries and those underperforming enterprises that had
no hope of innovation. It is hardly surprising that these constituencies congealed to resist
Gorbachev. Gorbachev counted on the reform constituencies of a new generation in the
party, the urban intelligentsia, and better performing enterprises in the economy (which
included the military) to carry the day. Weighed strictly as voting blocs, the contest was
closer than one might think, knowing the outcome. Gorbachev faced powerful opponents,
but he was not without resources. It was cross-domain feedbacks in dual hierarchy, I
argue, more than raw political resources, that defeated Gorbachev.
It is worth a moment’s detour at this point to reflect on why Gorbachev did not go
down the reform trajectory of China, especially since that success was known to him at
the time. Historically, the Soviet Union went down the economic trajectory of Hungary,
with all the political consequences of war on ministries that entailed, because of
momentum from Andropov and the military interests he represented. But
counterfactually, could Gorbachev have made a different choice? First and foremost, the
Chinese approach to economic reform would have been to start with agriculture, rather
than with large state enterprises. Gorbachev approved wholeheartedly of what the
Chinese had done. Gorbachev’s own background after all had been agriculture, not
industry. He repeatedly urged household leasing for Soviet agricultural cooperatives,
pointing explicitly to the Chinese success. In hindsight, it was consequential that he did
not push agricultural reform more vigorously. Gorbachev’s problem in my view was
political. Gorbachev’s primary power base was the new provincial first secretaries. All
provincial secretaries’ power bases, in turn, were the collective farms. Unlike Mao, Stalin
had taken heavy and light industry mostly out of their jurisdiction, leaving them only
with control over agriculture.124 In this structural inheritance, attacking the collective
farms for Gorbachev meant attacking his strongest supporters. There was no offsetting
plum like light industry to hand to them in exchange, as Deng had done. Ultimately,
therefore, it was the decentralized state-ownership system of figure 3 (triggered by the
historical legacy of Mao) that caused mobilizing upper cadres in China to lead to
agricultural reform. And it was the more centralized state-ownership system of the Soviet
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Union (triggered by the historical legacy of Stalin), that caused mobilizing upper cadres
in the Soviet Union to block the possibility of agricultural reform.
At the deeper level of informal political networks, the difference between the
Soviet Union and China was that reform politics under Gorbachev was a war between a
mainly unified party center and fragmented but deeply rooted family circles below. In
contrast, reform politics under Deng was a war between vertical factions, both of which
extended from the top of the party to the bottom. Because of network integuments,
Deng’s supporters were arrayed in personal factions, loyal to him. 125 Gorbachev never
did develop a personal faction within the communist party, loyal to him personally.
The reason for this was structural. Nomenklatura appointments meant essentially
that superiors appointed their subordinates, from centrally approved lists. This meant that
Gorbachev had complete control over his own high-level appointments, but that they (not
he) had control over their own appointments, the next level down. From this perspective,
the whole party system can be seen as nested family circles. The behavioral result of this
hierarchy of clienteles was obsequious subservience when provincial secretaries faced
upward toward their leader, but autocratic tyranny when they faced downward toward
their underlings. It was not difficult to say one thing in the Central Committee and do
another thing back home. Whether this amounted to centralization or to fragmentation
depended upon something else, like rates of social mobility and turnover.126 Gorbachev
(like Khrushchev and Kosygin before him) was faced with the challenge of reforming the
central-command system through a recalcitrant party structure, upon which his own
power was based. Stalin had already showed the ways out: high rates of cadre turnover,
and mass mobilization of the bottom.
The first counter-attack by the forces arrayed against Gorbachev was not really an
attack at all. It was paralysis and sandbagging, the simple refusal to obey. “Beginning in
1985 I flew to Moscow three years in a row, immersing myself in the atmosphere of the
capital, and met politicians, journalists, artists and writers. What were my impressions?
Perestroika was going at full speed – a real tidal wave! Then I travelled from the capital
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into the countryside. Go some hundred or two hundred kilometers away and things were
completely different – all quiet, no change.”127 Party newspapers were ordered by
Gorbachev to report on local problems; party newspapers were ordered by local party
officials to not. Enterprises were ordered by Gorbachev to increase worker discipline, to
accelerate production, and to try to innovate technologically. Business as usual.
Ministries were ordered to participate in planning for greater enterprise autonomy, but
they did so only to subvert that objective. 128 The economic reform process increasingly
became planned by a closed brain trust of centralized Gorbachev advisors, without
ministerial participation.
The more relevant model for success in the reform trajectory that Gorbachev was
on was Hungary. Janos Kádár in 1968 had successfully implemented the 1965 Kosygin
enterprise-autonomy reforms, which Kosygin himself had not. Gorbachev was a student
of the Hungarian experience: he visited there in 1986, and began talking up market
socialism back home. 129 Gorbachev let his expert advisors focus on the economics of that
experience; he focused on the politics.130 Politically, Kádár’s enterprise-autonomy
reforms had succeeded because they were embedded in his Alliance Policy of co-opting
complaisant non-communists into the communist government.131 The administrative side
of this gave the Hungarian communist party access to intelligentsia economic networks
and ideas, without losing political control. The social side of this folded civic
organizations into a Patriotic Popular Front. The first aspect reinforced in Gorbachev’s
mind the potential long-term value of his glasnost policy of artistic freedom. The second
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aspect reminded Gorbachev of Lenin’s soviets, in which workers councils were used by
Bolsheviks to mobilize and to control trade unions. 132 There remained legislative soviets
throughout the Soviet Union, even though Stalin had long since emasculated these into
passive institutions that did nothing more than rubber stamp decisions made by the party.
Breathing autonomy into both enterprises and the soviets became Gorbachev’s version of
Kádár’s Alliance Policy. More pregnant ideologically, it became Gorbachev’s version of
Lenin’s NEP. Thereby glasnost escalated in 1987 from ‘publicity’ to ‘openness’,
considerably beyond anything that Andropov would have approved.
Elections of low-level communists made their first appearance in this wave of
‘openness’ escalation by Gorbachev. Party regulars hardly went along with this without
sabotage and surreptitious manipulation, but in the summer of 1987 secret-ballot
elections with multiple communist candidates were held for local-government soviets,133
for the first time since Stalin’s brief constitution of 1938. Elections of enterprise directors
by factory worker councils were also authorized in the June 1987 law for enterprise
autonomy. Why this first step down the democratic road that led eventually and
unintentionally to the collapse of the Soviet Union? Realpolitik nudged Gorbachev down
his personal pilgrimage toward self-anointed messiah. Communist elections were
Gorbachev’s way of striking at the nomenklatura appointment monopoly of family
circles. They were also an outright bid for constituency support from worker councils and
from enterprise directors, for his economic-autonomy reforms. Kádár had implemented
factory-director elections in 1982 in Hungary, as part of his reform package, with positive
political benefit to him and no ill economic effects.
In addition to short-term realpolik, however, Gorbachev had a utopian side that
egotistically wanted to remake history, like Lenin, Stalin, Mao and other inspirational
communist leaders before him. 134 This is evident in his 1987 book on Perestroika from
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that period.135 Like his predecessors, Gorbachev believed that the higher purpose of the
communist party was not just to manipulate economic performance indicators and
incentives. It was also to change lives and to make new men. From this utopian point of
view, the problem of Brezhnev stagnation was a problem in the Soviet soul. As odd as
that sounds to westerners steeped in neo-classical economics, Gorbachev constantly
reiterated that the key to economic progress was to reform party cadres. Perhaps this was
just propaganda to himself as well as to outsiders, but Gorbachev came to believe that the
Andropov panopticon was not enough to get Soviet cadres and workers to work and to
care. What looked to his opponents like a drift toward western-style liberalism looked to
him like true communism.
To understand what happened next, as a consequence of the perestroika flagship
economic reform of the 1987 Law on State Enterprises, it is necessary to describe the
Soviet economy in more detail. Figure 5 depicts Soviet dual hierarchy in more detail than
does the generic figure 1. Ignore the third column in figure 5 labeled “Soviets” for now,
since that represents Gorbachev’s last political escalation to full democracy. The dualhierarchy system he was trying to reform was the first two columns. The figure makes it
clear that if direct management by ministries of enterprises is eliminated, then the only
other channel available for Gorbachev to reach down to the enterprises is the indirect
road through regional and local branches of the party.136 Of course the hope of the reform
was that enterprise directors eventually would learn to cycle around autocatalytic inputs
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and outputs by themselves – and thereby come to support Gorbachev – but that was in the
future. In the mean time, with only obstruction from the ministries, alternative
mechanisms had to be found to guide dependent state enterprises toward the alleged
nirvana of economic efficiency through maximizing profits. No legal markets were yet in
existence, so party was the only tool available.
-- figure 5 about here -The primary economic side of this dual hierarchy of course was the centralcommand system, ruled by ministries. Ministries administratively set physical production
targets for enterprises and managed the distribution of their products to other enterprises.
As discussed in the section on Stalin, this did not work poorly in the heavy-industry and
military sectors for which it was primarily intended. But agricultural and light industry
sectors were sucked dry, with shortages there rampant. This resource-extraction
explanation does not deny the other problems with central command – information and
soft budget constraints137 – which also contributed to shortages.
As is well known,138 the central-command system was not all that there was to the
Soviet economy. Informal resource flows emerged around the margins of central
command, to deal with the shortages and bottlenecks produced by it. Blat was direct
reciprocal barter between enterprises, using product inventories that they were not
supposed to have had. 139 Tolkach were third-party intermediaries who hunted around for
supplies in other enterprises, in order to arrange blat. Sometimes tolkach intermediaries
were employees or private entrepreneurs, but mostly they were party cadres. Local cadres
did that when needed supplies were geographically close at hand, and provincial cadres
did it when these were located farther afield. Indeed most of the day-to-day time of
provincial and district party secretaries was spent on the phone, trying to arrange supplies
for ‘their’ enterprises, which supplies theoretically they already had but actually they did
not. The hoarding necessary to engage successfully in blat and tolkach exacerbated the
shortages that provoked them to begin with. In dual-hierarchy structure, therefore,
Gorbachev’s political need to manage perestroika through the party implied increased
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dependence of the Soviet economy on ‘corrupt’ blat and tolkach, at least in the short run.
New systems always emerge from the chrysalis of old, but this implied the contradiction
of economic modernization founded on family circles.
This analysis makes Gorbachev’s task seem difficult, yet Kádár in Hungary and
Deng in China had pulled off the trick. How? The political precondition of his Alliance
Policy has already been mentioned. This mobilized political and economic networks
beyond the hermetically sealed communist party, without relinquishing party control. But
in addition, Kádár did something creative with his communist enterprises, which was
analogous to what Deng had done in China with party cadres. Both leaders legalized
private entrepreneurial activity within the boundaries of communist organizations.
Deng’s party-centered approach had been to do this through clientelism: namely, to let
party cadres give out permits to other cadres in exchange for kickbacks, mostly corporate
but sometimes personal. Kádár’s enterprise-centered approach – first with agricultural
coops in 1968 and then with industrial enterprises in 1982 – was to let employees set up
partnerships within state-owned enterprises, to use state assets for private gain after hours
and on weekends. 140 In both of these organizational innovations, the economic and
political interests of multi-functional party cadres and enterprise directors, respectively,
were aligned. In both post-reform countries, one got ahead in politics through making
money, 141 and one made money by being in politics. By aligning interests across
domains, powerful political constituencies emerged to support economic reforms that
privatized entrepreneurship without privatizing property.
Gorbachev’s problem in adopting either of these known organizational
innovations was two-fold. In the short run, he had no legal private markets, even on the
edges of the plan, on which to monetize political actions. He had plenty of blat and
tolkach networks, which were non-monetized markets. And he had plenty of political
clans and family circles, which manipulated those markets. But how to bring these
existing economic and political networks out into the open, and then have them discipline
each other through feedback, as Deng and Kádár had done?
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Gorbachev and his advisors were well aware of this issue and, in their flagship
State-Enterprise Law, they sensibly proposed wholesale markets for intermediate goods
in order to legalize and monetize such markets. This good idea failed because wholesale
presupposes inventories, that is, surpluses. But this was a shortage economy with no
surpluses anywhere in sight. Ministries aggressively used the loophole of “state orders”,
intended to permit the state to be one among many bidders, to soak up surpluses as soon
as they appeared. Kickstarting wholesale markets for intermediate goods required the
cooperation of ministries, which they refused to give. 142
The deeper problem, which gave ministries so much clout to begin with, was the
hyper-concentration of Soviet state enterprises, another legacy of Stalin. To exaggerate
only slightly, every industry was a monopoly. 143 “Market competition” has no meaning in
such a setting. Releasing prices from administration would have meant astronomical price
hikes everywhere. Appeals to neoclassical models of perfect competition only reveal the
historical ignorance of their advocates. The best that could be hoped for was some sort of
regulated contracting regime, perhaps like Japanese business groups.144
In the actual event, perestroika’s flagship reform, the 1987 Law on State
Enterprises (implemented in 1988), was an utter disaster economically. Annual growth
rates in the production of producer-goods industries plummeted from 3.7% in 1987, to
3.4% in 1988, to 0.6% in 1989, to -3.2% in 1990, and even lower under Yeltsin.
Household income inflated from 3.9% in 1987, to 9.2% in 1988, to 13.1% in 1989, to
16.9% in 1990, even as consumer-goods production stayed flat.145 The blat and tolkach
economic networks of the party were nowhere near strong enough to substitute for the
loss of material-supply guidance from central ministries, no matter how frantically party
cadres and enterprise directors worked their telephones. Hoarding by state enterprises
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exploded, and what little consumer goods there were disappeared from retail shelves. In
other words, autocatalysis in production was disrupted, and the interdependent system
suddenly collapsed.146 Mainly because of industrial hyper-concentration, the Soviet
economy could not be treated like Hungary or China. With his political hand, Gorbachev
intentionally was attacking family circles, but with his economic hand he unintentionally
was demanding that they save the day. Dissatisfaction spread from ministries and
reactionary segments of the party to Gorbachev’s own allies in the party. By 1988,
Gorbachev was starting to be in trouble.
Overt negative reaction first was expressed publicly in late 1987 and early 1988
under the umbrella of Yegor Ligachev, Gorbachev’s own number-two man, his closest
partner under Andropov. Ligachev had been Gorbachev’s aide in appointing provincial
first secretaries, and hence drew on Gorbachev’s own base of support. The opposition’s
demands were nailed to the door with the newspaper publication of an inflammatory
letter from school teacher Nina Andreyeva in March 1988, heavily scripted by Ligachev,
which called for restoration of the reputations of Stalin and nationalism. 147 A major
grievance of party conservatives was the rough treatment they had experienced in
newspaper exposés. Gorbachev aggressively beat back this challenge from Ligachev with
more purges, but a gauntlet had been cast.
Perestroika in flames, his party allies starting to doubt him, Gorbachev still tried
to save the day through glasnost. After all, the Soviet Union had endured far worse than
this in the Gulag, the Great Purges, and in World War II, and in those cases the central
leader’s popularity with the public had soared, at the expense of sullen underlings. Secure
(some might say barricaded) in the Kremlin, Gorbachev launched his final mass
mobilization campaign.
On the economic side, Gorbachev escalated again, this time from his 1987 Law
on State Enterprises, which focused on the reform of state enterprises, to his 1988 Law on
Cooperatives, which focused on creating a new private market of small production
firms. 148 Youth loved this; the elderly hated it.149 There were both Hungarian and Chinese
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precedents for market socialism – the coexistence of large state enterprises with small
market-oriented firms – although Kádár had been careful to channel his coops into the
bowels of state enterprises. Worker councils in Soviet state enterprises, however,
promptly voted for factory directors that increased their wages. 150 Household incomes
went quickly up, with not enough new to buy. Repressed inflationary pressures drove
administered prices and ‘true market’ prices even more out of whack than usual, making
prices meaningless as market signals of demand.
On the political side, Gorbachev also escalated dramatically by announcing at the
enlarged 19th Party Conference in June 1988 his intention to restructure the national
Supreme Soviet into a new, publicly elected Congress of People’s Deputies, to contain
both communist and non-communist representatives (but no non-communist parties).151
This was Gorbachev’s maximal effort to outflank and to crush his growing party
opposition by co-opting sympathetic non-communists. The coup de grace would have
been Gorbachev’s additional role as president of that national legislature, without giving
up his old role as general secretary of the communist party. Like Lenin’s soviets, the idea
was not to give up communist control: the electoral rules were carefully jiggered by
Gorbachev’s team to guarantee a communist majority.
Leading up to this large conference, the first of this size since 1941, elections
were held for party conference delegates, following the procedures of the local soviet
reforms of the previous year. “Gorbachev’s strategy was to outflank entrenched
opposition within the party structure by using secret ballot elections to encourage those
who supported reform to send sympathetic delegates to the conference.” 152 But in neither
this nor his enterprise-director elections was he fully successful in getting reformers
elected. Family circles defensively manipulated their grass-roots networks to control the
nomination processes.153 Gorbachev was reduced to springing his dramatic Congress of
People’s Deputies idea on the conference at the last minute for a snap vote, almost like a
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coup. Implementation plans soon followed in a September 1988 Central Committee
plenum, in which Gorbachev also unsheathed his ‘terrible swift sword’ of purging
Ligachev and his allies from the Politburo.154 In all this, Gorbachev was countering
failure in economics with mass mobilization in politics. Without Stalin in the
background, it is hard to understand, in my opinion, what is going on here.
Yeltsin begins to move the story into the next chapter, so I will truncate my
discussion of him and the last two years of Gorbachev’s reign. As is well known,
Gorbachev failed to maintain control over his own left wing, thereby losing both ends of
his coalition. Yeltsin was even more avid a reformer than Gorbachev, with none of
Gorbachev’s leadership need to compromise occasionally with Ligachev and his ilk.
Using the Moscow city government as his party base and glasnost as his cover, Yeltsin
repeatedly lashed out at Ligachev in public forums, accusing him of covering up
corruption and worse.155 Famous for his intemperance, Gorbachev used Yeltsin as his
attack dog, but this dog proved to be uncontrollable by his master, and had to be purged.
Freedom of the press gave Yeltsin the opportunity to keep himself in the public limelight,
even after his late 1987 demotion from Moscow office. I give Yeltsin no more than
facilitating credit for the collapse of the Soviet Union, despite his brave rallying of the
Russian people and the army at the very end, which beat back the 1991 coup of party
conservatives against Gorbachev. For sure, Yeltsin put himself opportunistically in the
position to catch reform-agenda pieces as the communist apparatus fell. But Gorbachev,
not Yeltsin, caused the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Economic flameout doomed Gorbachev’s desperate mass mobilization strategy.
Or rather: mass mobilization worked, but not in the way that Gorbachev had intended.
The upswell of public support for true democratic elections was startling, after all those
years of communist electoral hypocrisy, especially in economically advanced urban
areas. Because of the jiggering, Gorbachev and the communists still controlled the 1989
national Congress of People’s Deputies, but they now were riding a populist tiger. Instead
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of channeling populist fever into the party, soviet elections channeled populist fever
against the party. In controlled volumes, of course, Gorbachev needed this for his
leverage. As the loudly proclaimed sponsor of an economic disaster, however, Gorbachev
did not get much credit for himself. Yeltsin stole his reform thunder instead.
A jeweler’s hammer can break a diamond, but only along the lines of its internal
crystal cleavages. When the reform steamroller moved to its logical next stage of republic
elections in 1990, populist fever became channeled into ethnic nationalist separatism.
Gorbachev truly was shocked by this unexpected development, and tried to put on the
brakes, but it was too late. Baltic and Caucuses republics wanted to follow the 1989 lead
of their East European brothers in Poland, Hungary and East Germany. Yeltsin wrapped
himself in the Russian flag, and other entrepreneurial provincial first secretaries likewise
made quick political calculations about whether they were communist or popular
nationalists. Gorbachev had tried to use Stalinist tactics to browbeat a hierarchy of nested
family circles into demagogic obedience to him. But with no iron fist at the top, the
communist hierarchy fragmented along the lines of its natural cleavages. Some of these
family circles stubbornly stuck with communism. Some of them blew with the populist
wind of ethnic separatism. Some of them asset stripped their enterprises. Regardless of
the heterogeneous responses of local family circles, the top-down internal ligaments of
the communist party, tying them together, were no more. Skocpol said that revolutions
aren’t made; states fall. 156 I take this to mean not that states fall without agency, but that
they fracture through internal contradictions, otherwise known as destructive feedback.
A final counterfactual to consider is what if Gorbachev had behaved consistently
like Stalin, rather than backing in to Stalinist style almost against his own preferences.
Probably this would have meant sending tanks on East Germany, rather than let ethnic
separatism get started. Probably this also would have meant even higher volumes of
purges, deeper down. Doing these in the name of freedom would have been quite a trick,
but Stalin and Mao had shown the way – namely, to declare generational war of the
young against the old. There had to be enough room in the inn to absorb youth
clambering to get in. Successful market socialism – the expansion of light industry –
might have created this room, if opposition had been more brutally suppressed, perhaps
156
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with overt assistance from the KGB and the military. 157 Deng knew how to oscillate
between reform and repression, why did Gorbachev not also pull the trigger?
The problem with counterfactuals is that they are speculative, but I speculate that
a consistently Stalinist approach to reform could not have worked because of the Soviet
military. Dual-hierarchy pillars of economics and politics need to fit together in some sort
of synergistic feedback, but the military is a shadow third pillar in the background, which
regulates the interaction of these two. Hitler helped Stalin make the central command
system fit together with the Bolshevik party. As one result, the Soviet military was
centralized and tank centered. The Chinese military in contrast was a decentralized
militia, and the Hungarian military was non-existent. Gorbachev proceeded on this
military front as well, almost talking Ronald Reagan into nuclear disarmament at
Reykjavik. Without radical change in foreign policy, a powerful military interested in
high technology would block any major reallocation of resources to light industry,
required to make market socialism a success. Invading East Germany was the best chance
Gorbachev had to maintain the military’s political support, but that would have drained
precious economic resources away from perestroika and strengthened heavy industry and
central command. Again we are faced with the contradiction: what makes excellent (if
illiberal) sense from the political point of view, is counter-productive from the economic
point of view. Finding positive synergies between economic reform and the military
would have been hard, even if mass mobilization had been managed consistently the
Stalinist way. Strong militaries and capitalist economies is maybe a utopian ideal, but
there was no Soviet communist politics to get there.

Conclusion
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Figure 2. Autocatalysis in the Soviet heavy-industry sector (Harrison, 1985, p. 123)
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Figure 3. Chinese state-ownership of economic enterprises after Great Leap Forward
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Figure 4. The politics of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform
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Figure 5. Soviet Dual Hierarchy, without and with Gorbachev’s extension to soviets
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SOVIET UNION COMMUNIST STATE (~1975 under Breshnev)
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